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 In recent years there have been a surprising number of legal attacks on the restaurant chain called 
Hooters.  These attacks have all been based, one way or another, on a claim of sex discrimination 
in employment.  Yet the attacks vary considerably:  some are based on claims of sexual 
harassment, some on claims by private individuals that they have been discriminated against in 
hiring because they are male, still others on general claims that the chain is engaged in systemic 
sex discrimination.  Many of these claims are concerned with the troubling boundaries of the 
bona fide occupational qualification, that uncomfortable defense to claims of overt 
discrimination.  That a single business enterprise should be the target of so many different kinds 
of sex discrimination claims is curious. 
 
 These claims have inspired a broad, loud, public debate.  Spurred by the public relations efforts 
of the Hooters chain itself, hundreds of editorials have been written, legal scholars have ventured 
their opinions, and ordinary people can discuss the topic reasonably well.  This dissonant chorus 
of voices is struggling to create a public consciousness about the Hooters controversies, a 
consciousness that cannot avoid addressing the nature and importance of gender and sexuality in 
culture and business.  It is trying to reconstitute the world. 
 
 In this article, I use the tools of constitutive rhetoric to examine the texts created by several 
different kinds of voices speaking about this subject.  My aim is to try to assess and criticize the 
kind of worlds being woven by these texts.  In Part I, I review the relevant principles of sex 
discrimination law as they apply to employment.  In Part II, I explain and justify the tools of 
constitutive rhetoric.  In Part III, I recount the history of the Hooters restaurant chain and its legal 
difficulties involving sex discrimination.  In Part IV, I speculate about some theoretical 
commonalities between the different types of sex discrimination claims against Hooters, 
necessarily discussing some rudimentary notions of feminist legal theory.  In Part V,  I analyze 
some public statements made by the parties, or the central combatants, involved in these 
controversies; specifically, I examine a press kit distributed by Hooters, a press release published 
by the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission, and an advertisement published by Hooters.  
In Part VI, I examine the public texts created by two lawyers who debated in print on the subject 
in a lawyers' trade journal.  In Part VII, I move to a discussion of texts created by non-lawyers, 
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specifically a widely-read newspaper editorial and a nationally broadcast radio commentary.  Part 
VIII is a conclusion. 
 
 
 
I.  Background:  Sex Discrimination in Employment 
 
 As everyone knows, employers are generally forbidden to discriminate among their employees 
based on sex.  Sex discrimination is specifically prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, and applies to discrimination in hiring as well as discrimination among employees already 
hired.1  Sex is one of five forbidden categories of discrimination specifically named by Title 
VII;2 additional specific categories of discrimination in employment are forbidden by other 
statutes.3 
 
 It is of both historical and legal interest that the sex discrimination provision was added rather 
belatedly to Title VII when it was adopted in 1964; consequently there is very little in the way of 
legislative history describing precisely what Congress had in mind by adopting that specific 
provision, or what sort of interpretations it would have preferred.4  Historically sex 
discrimination in employment has remained socially acceptable to a much later date, and in more 
ways, than has race or religious discrimination.5  Further, while particular varieties of race, 
religious and national origin discrimination in employment can frequently be traced to specific 
historical moments such as the competition for jobs between a new wave of immigrants into the 
United States and those already present,6 sex discrimination appears to pervade Western culture 
from its earliest known antecedents.7 
 
 Judicial decisions under Title VII have distinguished between two distinct varieties of illegal 
discrimination, called "disparate treatment" and "disparate impact".  Disparate treatment sex 
discrimination is an overt difference in the way men and women are dealt with as employees or 
applicants.  For example, refusing to hire women as executives would be a type of disparate 
treatment sex discrimination.8  Disparate impact sex discrimination, on the other hand, involves 
facially neutral tests, standards or rules that have the effect of making it more difficult for one sex 
to obtain employment or promotion, or to work within the employment environment.9  For 
example, a height requirement, while not overtly or explicitly treating the sexes differently, will 
have the effect of making it more difficult for one sex to obtain employment because the two 
sexes tend to have a general height difference.  So far as I can determine, all claims of 
discrimination against Hooters have been based on disparate treatment, rather than disparate 
impact sex discrimination.  Consequently the remainder of this discussion will focus on disparate 
treatment. 
 
 In addition to the relatively simple type of discrimination in which one sex is preferred over 
another, a second variety of disparate treatment has been identified, sometimes called "sex-plus" 
discrimination.  In sex-plus discrimination, different standards of conduct are required of female 
employees than of male employees -- or, to put it differently, the employer discriminates not 
against one sex as a whole, but against a subgroup within that sex.10  Consider, for example, a 
female employee who is fired or denied a promotion because her behavior is "insufficiently 
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feminine".  Strictly speaking, she has not received a lower preference or priority because of her 
sex, but she has been required to engage in a different class of performance because of it -- 
presumably no man would be fired for being insufficiently feminine.11  This constitutes illegal 
disparate treatment discrimination.12 
 
 For purposes of this article, it is also useful to focus on sexual harassment, a form of behavior 
which has been recognized as a form of disparate treatment sex discrimination violating Title 
VII.13  Generally speaking, the courts recognize two separate forms of sexual harassment.  The 
first, called "quid pro quo" sexual harassment, consists of offering employment benefits or 
opportunities (or threatening employment sanctions or impediments) in exchange for sexual 
favors.14  The second, called "hostile environment" sexual harassment, involves the creation of a 
work environment that is made hostile, offensive or intimidating for the particular employee 
because of her sex.15  Normally the environment must be so altered as to affect a term, condition 
or privilege of employment, although no specific damage or injury to the employee need be 
shown.16  In all cases the harassment must be unwelcome, and its severity (that is, whether it 
actually does effect a term, condition or privilege of employment) is assessed from the 
perspective of the reasonable victim, or as has been sometimes said, the "reasonable woman."17 
 
 Employers are liable for acts of sexual harassment committed by supervisory personnel against 
subordinates, and also for such acts committed by persons acting in an agency capacity for the 
employer.18  Employers will also be held liable for acts of sexual harassment committed against 
employees by fellow employees, and may be held liable for such acts committed by non-
employees, in situations where the employer had reason to know of the harassment and failed to 
take corrective action.19  For example, if an employer learns that one of its employees is being 
repeatedly harassed by a particular customer, and the employer then fails to attempt to prevent 
further acts of harassment by the customer, the employer may be held liable for subsequent acts 
of harassment by that customer.  Of course, the degree to which the employer is actually able to 
exercise control over what is done by a non-employee will be taken into account in determining 
liability.20 
 
 There are at least two defenses that need to be considered in light of the Hooters controversies.  
First is the classic statutory defense to disparate treatment claims, the bona fide occupational 
qualification, or BFOQ.  Title VII provides that an employer will not be held liable for 
discrimination when sex, religion or national origin is a "bona fide occupational qualification 
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise."21  For 
example, an employer may legally refuse to hire women as attendants for a men's washroom.  
The boundaries of the BFOQ defense have gradually evolved since the enactment of Title VII, 
and are still not entirely fixed.  Courts consistently acknowledge BFOQs when issues of sexual 
privacy are concerned, as in the washroom example above.22  Similarly, where the hiring of one 
sex is needed for reasons of authenticity or genuineness, as in the case of an actor, a BFOQ 
exists.23  On the other hand, discrimination based on presumed qualities of, or stereotypes about, 
the sexes does not present a BFOQ.24  For example, an employer may not refuse to hire female 
sales personnel on the grounds that women don't sell as well as men do.  Nor may an employer 
claim a BFOQ simply because of the prejudiced preferences of co-workers or customers.25  
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 The case of UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc. held that a BFOQ can exist only when the particular 
characteristic (e.g., sex) is actually necessary in order to enable the worker to perform her job.26  
In that lawsuit, women of childbearing age had been denied certain employment opportunities 
because of fear that lead in the workplace environment might be harmful to any fetuses those 
women might conceive.  The Supreme Court held that an employer cannot base a BFOQ on such 
health concerns of the employer or the employer's family -- the employer's only proper inquiry is 
to the employee's ability to do the work required of her.27  On the other hand, the definition of 
exactly what constitutes the "ability to perform the job" is less clear than it might be.  There have 
been cases involving female guards in men's prisons, where courts have held that a BFOQ exists 
because the reaction of the male prisoners to the female guards would make the guards' ability to 
perform their work materially more difficult, and would impair the functioning of the prison.28 
 
 As to the question of whether the sex-appeal of a worker qualifies as a BFOQ, the decisions are 
not entirely clear.  I have been able to locate only two decisions that appear to actually have said, 
in dicta, that the employer was justified in discriminating based on sex because the job involved 
being sexually attractive to men.  These were 1971 companion decisions of the New York 
Human Rights Appeal Board (an institution that was abolished not long afterwards), involving 
the Playboy Club.29  These cases have been cited for that proposition, but the purpose of the 
citation has been to distinguish the case sub judice from the Playboy cases.30  To complicate 
matters, three years later the Appellate Division upheld another decision of the Appeal Board, 
holding that sex was not a BFOQ for a restaurant that wished to attire female waitresses "in 
alluring costumes" in order to "enhance petitioner's food sales volume."31 
 
 
Further, in Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co.32 the court rejected the similar claim that sex 
appeal, and therefore sex, can be a BFOQ for a flight attendant or ticket agent hired by a 
commercial airline.  In Wilson it appears that the company sincerely believed that female sex-
appeal was a device that would attract male customers, and engaged in active marketing to 
promote that strategy.33  The court, however, held that "to recognize a BFOQ for jobs requiring 
multiple abilities, some sex-linked and some sex-neutral, the sex-linked aspects of the job must 
predominate."34  In the case of the airline, the 
 
 sex-lined job functions are only "tangential" to the essence of the occupations and 
business involved.  Southwest is not a business where vicarious sex entertainment is the 
primary service provided.  Accordingly, the ability of the airline to perform its primary 
business function, the transportation of passengers, would not be jeopardized by hiring 
males.35 
 
The court held that sex does not become a BFOQ merely in order to enhance a marketing 
strategy.36  The negative implication, however, of the language quoted above is that if a business 
could show that "vicarious sex entertainment" was the primary service it provided, then a BFOQ 
could be established. 
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 The second defense that needs some examination in the context of the Hooters problem is a 
theoretical one that has never been adopted by the courts.  Kelly Ann Cahill, in a note specifically 
discussing the Hooters disputes, has suggested that an "assumption of risk" defense might be 
successfully employed against certain claims of sexual harassment committed by the customers 
of a business.37  The theory is that female employees who voluntarily agree to work in such 
capacities as, for example, topless dancers, are obviously aware that their work is unusually 
susceptible to sexual harassment -- that is, that the risk of such harassment by the customers is 
higher there than in other occupations.  Consequently, an employee holding such a job who was 
harassed by a customer would not, in tort law, be able to recover for the injury because she 
voluntarily entered into the situation knowing of the risk.38  A similar argument, of course, could 
be made about any type of discrimination:  for example, if an applicant voluntarily takes a job at 
a location where he actually knows that members of his religion are treated badly, then it might 
be argued that he has assumed the risk of religious discrimination.39 
 
 I am inclined to disagree with Cahill's argument, because I believe that there is a qualitative 
difference between tort law and anti-discrimination statutes.  The purpose of tort law is to 
compensate plaintiffs for injuries and sanction wrongdoers, while the purpose of Title VII is to 
prevent a particular sort of behavior which Congress believes to be unacceptable in interstate 
commerce.  Consequently, the damages suffered by the plaintiff, and the question of whether she 
voluntarily brought them upon herself, are not really the issue.40  Nonetheless, an awareness of 
this concept may be useful in looking at the public and popular texts created around the Hooters 
controversies. 
 
 
II.  The Lens:  Constitutive Rhetoric 
 
 The last quarter-century has seen a revival of the traditional legal interest in literature and 
language.  In spite of, or perhaps because of, the contemporary tendency to speak of legal issues 
as problems to be solved with the tools of social science, a growing number of scholars are 
embarking on studies that assume that law is one of the humanities.41  There is no single 
"movement" or direction that characterizes this group of scholars other than their focus on the 
places where law and literature can inform one another or may benefit from similar types of 
analysis.42 
 
 I believe that four or five distinct strains can be identified:  First, there are those who believe that 
lawyers, judges, legislators and "law" itself need to learn the lessons that literature can teach 
about humanity.  They find the suppositions contained in lawyers' work frequently to be too 
abstracted, or based too much on cultural assumptions that are problematic at best; in literature, 
they believe, we can see how these assumptions or abstractions fail when confronted with the 
experiences of people.43  Second, there are those who believe that they can use tools of literary 
criticism to interpret such legal texts as statutes, cases and, above all, the Constitution.  They 
bring their (usually postmodern) critical faculties to bear on such concepts as original intent, 
legislative history and stare decisis.44  Third, there are those who are interested in how law 
becomes represented in such cultural artifacts as literature and film; how do people see the law, 
and what do they think of it?  What influence do legal institutions appear to have on society as a 
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whole?45  Fourth, there are those who use creative storytelling and personal narrative as a way of 
informing theoretical legal points.46 
 
 The fourth avenue, the one informing this article, has been called "constitutive rhetoric."47  One 
may look at any text as a conversation in which the writer or speaker is attempting to establish or 
maintain a relationship with the reader or listener.  (I say "attempting", but I am not speaking of 
the subjective desires of the individual holding the pen; rather, I mean the voice of the author as it 
appears in the text itself.)  This relationship also includes some sort of connection with, or 
attitudes concerning, any people who (or topics that) are discussed in the text.  The relationships 
thus sketched out may be seen as a sort of "constitution", a blueprint for how these 
interrelationships are going to work.  How is power to be divided up?  What is the role to be 
played by the listener?  What sorts of things may the listener do to, or think about, the third 
parties who are mentioned? 
 
 Going further:  the relationships or constitution created by a text may be seen as a normative 
statement about how the world should work.  That is, by creating a set of relationships in the text, 
the writer makes an implied declaration that these are the sort of relationships one ought to create 
if one has the power.  For example, if my text bases its ethos on the notion that I am a morally 
superior person, and therefore ought to be believed, I have impliedly said that morally superior 
people ought to be believed because of their moral superiority.  Since the text may be taken as 
recommending a way of relating to the world and to other people, it can and should be critically 
examined from an ethical and political viewpoint.  Is this text creating a good set of 
relationships?  If this language were the constitution of a city-state, defining your role in it, 
would you want to live there? 
 
 Consider:  what if one were to write a book that created one set of relationships while 
recommending another?  For example, what if I wrote that "All persons are entitled to equal 
respect in their beliefs", while simultaneously using rhetoric that flatly denied respect to the 
beliefs of anyone but myself and implied that such respect was neither necessary nor proper?  In 
such a case, the literal meaning of the text itself would be called into question.  You might 
conclude that I (the author's voice, not the author) did not really believe in according equal 
respect to all views but was lying about it.  You might conclude that I did not believe in that form 
of recommendation but was being ironic.  You might conclude that I was trying to teach you 
something about the nature of recommendations, of respect, or of persuasion.  In any case, it 
would be impossible simply to take that sentence at face value; the constitutive rhetoric would 
change the meaning of the text.  It would also lead you, at some level, to question the relationship 
you have with me as reader to writer.48 
 
 The constitutive rhetoric of a text is a serious matter, especially in a legal text.  What we do to 
people, in real life and with real power, is enabled by the relationships we imagine we have with 
them; these relationships are created by texts.  It is no coincidence, for example, that countries at 
war routinely use dehumanizing rhetoric to talk about the enemy; the rhetoric creates a 
relationship in which doing the otherwise unthinkable -- deliberately killing another person -- 
becomes not only acceptable but commendable.  Of course the weapons to wage war, and the 
physical strength to do it, exist anyway; but the will to pull the trigger comes from the ways in 
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which people are able to think about doing the deed.  In a real sense, what we say shapes what we 
do. 
 
 You see that I have not recommended a particular ethical system or political view as the starting 
place for such an analysis.  This is deliberate, but for mixed reasons.  First, this sort of rhetorical 
analysis is more of a tool for finding the ethical and political presuppositions of a text than it is 
for finding set of ethical or political rules with which to appraise of those presuppositions.  To 
that extent, it is possible that people with contradictory ethical or political views could use 
rhetorical analysis to arrive at similar conclusions about what the rhetoric means, but opposite 
conclusions as to whether that meaning is a good one.  On the other hand, I think there are some 
ethical or political viewpoints that may be impossible to view favorably using constitutive 
rhetoric.  This is because constitutive rhetoric necessarily involves looking at relationships and 
communities between people -- this presupposes that we do have such things as relationships and 
communities and that they do have an ethical dimension.  Consequently, a form of rhetoric in 
which people were tools for the use of others, or in which a rugged individual entirely disclaimed 
any responsibility for, or consideration of, other individuals' interests, would appear rather 
unattractive in this system.  In that sense, this tool is probably more useful to those who believe 
in a Kantian "kingdom of ends" than those who believe that the needs, hopes and desires of 
individuals are components of a larger social utility.49 
 
 
III.  The Hooters Cases Themselves 
 
 Hooters is a restaurant chain that originated in Clearwater, Florida, in the early 1980s; in the mid-
1990s it is the fastest-growing restaurant chain in America.  It serves such fare as hamburgers, 
chicken wings and fried fish sandwiches, as well as wine and beer.50  The restaurant is supposed 
to simulate a "beach party" environment, with decor including bare wooden floors and walls, and 
tables with bar stools.  The servers in this restaurant are exclusively young women, and are 
officially referred to as "Hooters girls."51  These servers are usually dressed in a uniform 
consisting of a halter or tied tee shirt with the restaurant logo on the front, orange running shorts 
and sneakers.52  The logo on the shirt is the word "HOOTERS" superimposed over a drawing of 
an owl; the oversized eyes of the owl form the two O's in the name.  The servers are generally 
instructed to be friendly with customers, including sitting at the table and talking to them.53  
According to the chain's marketing information, the servers are supposed to give the impression 
of "cheerleaders" or the "girl next door".54  The restaurant is decorated with various posters and 
signs of a humorous nature, many of which could be taken to have sexual connotations.  The 
menu is replete with humor of a self-deprecating nature; for example, the restaurant history on 
the back of the menu suggests that the founders are amateurs who don't know what they are 
doing.  The chain's clientele are primarily adult males, although some women and children do 
dine there.55 
 
 There appears to be some confusion about the restaurant's primary marketing focus.  Certainly in 
the wake of recent legal disputes, Hooters has been claiming that it is primarily in the business of 
selling sex-appeal.56  However, at times there have been challenges, usually in zoning boards, to 
placing a Hooters restaurant in some communities.  In those communities Hooters bills itself as a 
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"family restaurant,"57 a term which is susceptible to the interpretation that the restaurant's 
primary focus is not the selling of sexuality. 
 
 Beginning in the early 1990s, a number of sexual harassment lawsuits have been filed against 
Hooters by servers working at different Hooters locations.  These lawsuits usually complain of 
inappropriate or aggressive sexual overtures by patrons, as well as alleging that Hooters 
deliberately creates an environment that encourages such harassment.58  A few of the cases also 
allege various forms of harassment by supervisors.59  So far as I have been able to determine, all 
of these cases (save the most recent one, which is still pending) have been settled out of court.60  
As noted above, these cases have given rise to speculation that an assumption of risk defense 
may be appropriate for some sexual harassment cases.61 
 
 In December, 1993, Savino Latuga and David Gonzales, two men, filed an employment 
discrimination complaint in United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois 
(Chicago) against the local Hooters and the chain entity itself, alleging sex discrimination in 
violation of Title VII because they were not hired as servers.62  Currently, the plaintiffs are suing 
as representatives of the class of men denied employment at Hooters because of sex.63  As of this 
writing the case is still pending.  In its answer, Hooters alleges, inter alia, that sex is a BFOQ for 
the job of "Hooters girl."64 
 
 Apparently at the same time that the Latuga cases were proceeding, the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) was conducting its own independent investigation of Hooters's 
hiring practices.  The exact contours of this investigation are not public knowledge,65 but it is 
known that late in 1995 the EEOC sent a lengthy conciliation offer to Hooters.  The only aspects 
of this offer which are known to the public are those specifically mentioned later by Hooters in 
its press release.66  On November 15, 1995, Hooters held a press conference concerning the 
EEOC investigation and commenced an advertising campaign criticizing the EEOC for the 
investigation.67  While these advertisements have taken various forms, the central legal assertion 
behind all of them is that sex is an obvious BFOQ for a server in a Hooters restaurant.68  As 
mentioned above, a very large number of newspaper editorials were written based on this press 
release, mostly favoring Hooters's side of the argument.  Various members of Congress made 
public statements criticizing the EEOC.69  In April or May of 1996, the Chairman of the EEOC, 
Gilbert F. Casellas, apparently sent a letter to a member of Congress in which he indicated that 
the EEOC would not be pursuing the investigation, largely due to scarcity of resources.70  This 
letter was "leaked" to the press and caused another set of editorials to be written. 
 
 
IV.  Underlying Theoretical Issues. 
 
 The two different discrimination-based attacks on Hooters -- the sexual harassment cases and the 
cases alleging discrimination against male applicants -- are different legal articulations of the 
same underlying question:  how legitimate is it to base a business on the sale of female sexuality, 
sexual appeal, or sexual services?71  It could be said, for example, that the reason there may be 
sexual harassment problems at Hooters is because Hooters is overtly trading on the sexual appeal 
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of its women servers, consequently causing some confusion in the minds of some patrons.  The 
patron confuses sexual display with sexual availability, and consequently engages in harassing 
behavior.  Absent the overt sexual display, the patron's confusion (and harassing behavior) would 
be reduced or eliminated.  Similarly, the BFOQ argument that the job of server at Hooters 
("Hooters girl") can be performed only by women is based on the assertion that the core 
marketing strategy of the business is to sexually attract and titillate heterosexual males.  In each 
case, one suspects that the plaintiffs or investigators might like to argue that a restaurant may not 
legitimately provide vicarious sexual services.72  Yet it is difficult to make this argument within 
the language of any specific statute, because no statute has yet been interpreted to forbid such 
services per se and it is difficult to see how any extant statute could be so interpreted.73  Instead, 
opponents of Hooters couch their arguments in terms of "sex discrimination in employment" 
because that is all they have to work with. 
 
 However, it is worth considering whether the very nature of the sexuality-based restaurant could 
be construed to offend Title VII.  One view of Title VII would say that such a business directly 
implicates the precise reasons that laws against sex discrimination are necessary.  The cultural, 
political and economic reasons behind employment discrimination against women were all based 
on assumptions concerning what women could, or should, do.  Because women were perceived 
as having limited roles -- all related to sexual contact with men, childbirth, child-rearing or 
maintaining the home -- there tended to be prejudice against their working in occupations that did 
not directly involve them in those roles.  Title VII's prohibition on sex discrimination in 
employment, therefore, can be seen as a direct attack on existing cultural, political and economic 
arrangements concerning the proper role of women in society, the family or the economy.  This is 
why hostile environment sexual harassment has been interpreted to be a violation of Title VII as 
it was originally enacted:  women who are subjected to continual sexual treatment on the job are 
essentially being placed back in the roles from which Title VII was supposed to free them.  Title 
VII, it could be argued, is designed to give women a function in the workplace other than a 
function dependent on their relationship to men.  It could be argued that a business whose whole 
purpose is to trade on those older assumptions -- insisting that women be sexual objects, child-
raisers or homemakers -- is engaging in and bolstering the very practices Title VII was designed 
to fight. 
 
 The branch of feminist legal analysis identified with Catherine Mackinnon takes a "dominance 
approach", rather than a "difference approach", to equality law generally and sex discrimination 
law in particular.  The theory maintains that the key question in sex discrimination law is not 
whether a practice treats the sexes differently from one another, but rather whether this practice 
perpetuates the subordination of women by men.74  Utilizing this theory, one could argue that 
Hooters should be seen as perpetuating the domination of men over women because the 
commodification of sexuality within Western culture consistently converts the seller (nearly 
always female) into the servant of the buyer (nearly always male).75  As Jeannie Sclafani Rhee 
summarizes the argument:  
 
  The construction of female sexuality is one of submission to dominance.  Yet the 
construct is so pervasive that its inequality cannot be seen, and it is merely taken as the 
norm of sexuality.  The problematic construct of female sexuality is what makes its 
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objectification so harmful, and in turn what makes its commodification, even by women 
themselves, a most dangerous proposition . . . .  The construction of women's sexuality is 
tainted to the degree that any commodification of it only acts to reify its maladrous effect 
on the social psyche.76 
 
 The post-structuralist feminist counter-argument, ably made by Rhee herself, is that the 
commodification of sexual display gives women a unique economic and social power that they 
have in few other venues.  To forbid the existence of businesses whose purpose was to sell 
sexuality would deny women the opportunity to exercise that power.77  Rhee goes further, saying 
that sexual harassment 
 
 can be recast as a man's recognition of the power that women's bodies temporarily hold 
over him, and the resultant attempt to possess that power for himself -- literally to strip it 
physically away from the woman.  The consequent attempt to redress sexual harassment 
ought not to assume the same form.  Rather than stripping women of the power of their 
own sexuality, the response must prohibit men from seizing public displays of female 
sexuality as theirs for the taking.78 
 
Thus, for some, the empowerment of women and women's sexuality not only permits, but 
demands that businesses like Hooters be allowed to exist.79 
 
 On a cultural level, the debate over the ethics of commodifying sexuality is surely part of what is 
going on in the debate about Hooters.  Many editorials began with the assertion that Hooters is 
clearly offensive, but that its offensiveness does not render it illegal.  The rebuttals usually stick 
to the letter of Title VII, and attempt to argue about the "true" function of Hooters.  The "true 
function" question is a good starting place, because it is unclear that a restaurant can claim that 
sexuality is its true function if an airline such as Southwest cannot make the same claim.  
Further, there is a factual question as to whether Hooters actually believes that sexual appeal is 
its core function.  Apparently its arguments to hostile zoning boards included the assertion that 
Hooters's core identity is that of a "family restaurant" -- yet most Americans would probably 
deny that the concept of a "family restaurant" can be reconciled with the overt sale of sexuality.80  
Yet in all of these concessions about the offensiveness of Hooters, there is very little speculation 
as to why Hooters is offensive, or what relation its offensiveness may have to the economic place 
of women in society. 
 
 I would argue that the editorial writers, lawyers and others who write about these cases are 
actually attempting to discuss the cultural legitimacy of sexuality-based business.  There is a 
certain reluctance to do this, both because American law pretends not to speak on cultural issues 
and because there is a strong libertarian streak in our culture that believes that any sort of 
sexually-based behavior involving consenting adults should be a private matter not subject to the 
criticism of others.  Consequently the language used by these writers is couched in technical 
terms such as employment discrimination, about which we can pretend that we do not have a 
cultural or spiritual attachment.  
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 In an article like this one, maintaining that "good language" can be used by either side in an 
argument and promising further that it will assess the language regardless of the substantive 
outcome, it is important for the writer to be candid about his own prejudices and predilections on 
substantive questions.  Without such candor, the reader may justifiably suspect that an analysis of 
"language" is being used merely as a smokescreen or device to persuade the reader of the 
rightness of the writer's desired outcomes.  Therefore I will be explicit about where my 
sympathies lie on the "merits" of these disputes:  I don't like female sexuality used as a marketing 
tool or a business device, because I think it runs counter to the notions of equality and equal 
opportunity that are central to the aspirations behind Title VII; I also think that it demeans both 
the workers and the customers.  On the other hand, if I accept arguendo that the core of Hooters 
business is truly the sale of sexuality, then, based on the strict language of Title VII, I am not sure 
that I can escape the conclusion that such a business deserves to claim that sex is a BFOQ -- and I 
am loath to do an "end run" around the legislature based merely on my own beliefs.  (I actually 
have a lot of sympathy for the "dominance" approach to equality law, but I am certain that no 
such approach was behind the passage of any but a discrete and well-publicized group of 
statutes.)  Finally, based on my one and only visit to Hooters, undertaken while I was writing my 
first draft of this article, I am not sure that I really believe that sexuality is as central to Hooters's 
business as has been claimed.  The sexuality, in fact, seemed rather understated when compared 
with much in contemporary culture, and was less interesting than the self-effacing humor on the 
back of the menu.  You should be aware of these biases of mine when you read what follows in 
the article. 
 
 As I have noted elsewhere, the act of displaying my biases is, in and of itself, a valuable 
rhetorical device.  By displaying my prejudices I cause you to believe that I can be trusted to tell 
the truth, that I am not trying to mislead you.81  But is that misleading in and of itself?  Could an 
unscrupulous writer use such a device to yet more subtly influence the reader to adopt his 
substantive views?  I hope not.  What I hope I am doing is teaching you about language by 
pointing out that even one's own rhetoric is subject to scrutiny.  You should assess my rhetoric 
just as I am assessing the rhetoric of those texts discussed in this article.  I suppose that it might 
be possible for me to do this myself -- that is, stand outside of my own language and analyze it.  
But I don't think I trust myself to carry out such an exercise with any kind of dispassionate 
distance, nor can I think of a way to convince you that I am capable of it. 
 
 
V.  Quasi-Official Speech:  Public Statements of the "Parties" 
 
 Judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings, such as litigation or administrative enforcement, are 
political acts taking place in a political context.  It is axiomatic and, perhaps, passé to say this, 
but it is sometimes easy to forget that civil disputes take place in a government context.  The 
statutes at issue are created, the judges or administrators are appointed, and the structure of the 
entire system is developed and amended, through the political process.  Parties frequently worry 
as much (or more) about the popular perception of their dispute than the formal judicial or 
administrative result. 
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 One reason is that popular or political pressure can affect the outcome of a proceeding; this is not 
supposed to happen, but judicial and administrative officers are human beings, prone to as much 
self-doubt and ambiguity as the rest of us.  Only the most robust of us can remain truly 
convinced, in the light of lopsided, vitriolic criticism, that we are right.  In the alternative, 
popular sentiment may succeed in changing the very laws around which the dispute revolves.  
Further, in disputes involving business the bad publicity associated with a lawsuit can be as 
damaging to the company as any legal or equitable remedy provided by a court or agency -- or the 
good publicity may substantially increase profits.  The same can be said of political figures, 
whose careers may be ruined by the existence of the dispute even if their side of the argument is 
entirely vindicated by the outcome.  In criminal law as well, an accused person is not necessarily 
"off the hook" simply because she is found "not guilty."82 
 
 As a result, we frequently see concerted efforts, especially in cases involving prominent persons 
or entities, to affect public opinion.  The parties or their representatives regularly make public 
statements about the case, not only in response to reporters' questions but spontaneously, in 
lengthy interviews or press conferences.  They develop public personae that may (or may not) be 
entirely different from those they adopt in court. 
 
 Because this is rhetoric directly aimed at public opinion, it may have an overtly constitutive 
nature:  the speakers are aware that they are addressing a broader community, appealing to its 
self-conception and aspirations.  In this sense, litigants speaking to the public have more in 
common with political speechmakers than with lawyers in a lawsuit.  They deliberately define a 
collective identity in order to mobilize it.83 
 
 As described above, the EEOC's investigation of Hooters resulted in a conciliation offer which 
Hooters found unpalatable.  Hooters responded, on November 15, 1995, by holding a press 
conference and engaging in an expensive advertising campaign criticizing the EEOC for its 
investigation.  This section of the article is devoted to an examination of the public statements 
made by Hooters in this conference and campaign, and by the EEOC in reaction to it.  In this 
discussion I wish to pay particular attention to the type of community Hooters and EEOC appear 
to be envisioning in their exhortations. 
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 A.  The Hooters Press Kit 
 
 The press kit distributed at the time of the press conference on November 15, 1995 contains a 
number of separate items:  a press release;84 a "question & answer" sheet;85 a "backgrounder" on 
the dispute;86 a "fact sheet" about the chain;87 statements by Mike McNeil (Hooters's vice 
president of marketing),88 Cheryl Whiting (director of training for Hooters of America),89 and 
Meghan O'Malley-Barnard (a self-described "Hooters Girl")90 as well as their biographies;91 
articles from the National Law Journal lampooning the EEOC92 and the Latuga case;93 a recent 
trade journal article describing fast-growing food service companies;94 a summary of Hooters's 
charitable giving;95 and a list of Hooters locations.96  While these documents are different in 
type and quality, they display an instructive uniformity in tone and content.  They were clearly 
drawn by the same hand for the same purpose. 
 
 Probably the most significant document in the press kit is the press release, entitled "Hooters 
Says No to EEOC Demand It Hire Hooters Guys:  Restaurant Chain Says Federal Agency Needs 
Common Sense".97  This release is the document most likely to be read, quoted, or used as the 
basis of an editorial.  It contains about 500 words, primarily quotations from Mike McNeil's 
statement.  Like most press releases, it is designed so that a verbatim transcription could be used 
as a traditional newspaper article.  It is written in the third person, attributes all of Hooters's 
positions to McNeil or Whiting, and is cast so as to appear to be an objective report of the facts.  
Essentially the only facts it contains, however, are summaries of Hooters's opinions and position. 
 
 Here are the opening paragraphs of the press release: 
 
 HOOTERS SAYS NO TO EEOC DEMAND IT HIRE HOOTERS GUYS 
 
 Restaurant Chain Says Federal Agency Needs Common Sense 
 
 
  Washington, D.C. -- The Hooters Restaurant chain said today that it will resist EEOC 
demands that it hire men to work as "Hooters Girls," a proposal that Hooters officials and 
franchise owners say would drive them out of business. 
 
  Hooters of America Vice President Mike McNeil said that conciliation talks between 
Hooters representatives and the EEOC have foundered because Commission demands 
would have imposed unmanageable financial and practical burdens on every one of 
Hooters' 170 stores. 
 
  "The issue isn't sex discrimination. It's common sense," McNeil told a press conference at 
which he announced a grassroots campaign to convince the EEOC to leave Hooters alone 
and direct its energy toward genuine discrimination problems. 
 
  "The EEOC has a backlog of about 100,000 cases.  It's hard to believe that forcing 
Hooters to change its business concept by hiring 'Hooters Guys' should be one of its top 
priorities," McNeil added.98 
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 Throughout this document, use of a reportorial, third-person voice has a powerful effect.  First of 
all, it sounds dispassionate:  it is hard to remember that we are not seeing the observations of a 
disinterested, outside party.  This is all the more striking when we realize that a newspaper might 
easily use the release, word-for-word, as its story -- in which case the reader would have no way 
of knowing that the sentences were drafted by Hooters representatives with the specific intent of 
influencing public opinion.  In this sense the press release creates a kind of rhetorical lie:  the 
reader is cued to receive a verified, reasonably removed report of actual facts, when in fact every 
word has been crafted as a device to influence the reader.  How much more on our guard would 
we be if the press release simply said, "We are Hooters and here is our opinion"?99 
 
 Second, the reportorial voice disassociates itself from its own views.  The phrase, "Hooters says", 
"McNeil said", or similar language appears over and over again.  Yet in actual fact, as we know, 
this document was drafted by Hooters itself, its public relations firm or its attorneys, possibly 
even by McNeil.  The impact of this disassociation is striking, because Hooters's views are 
actually given more prominence by this device.  It is one thing to say, "I want to tell you my 
views"; it is another to say, "I want to tell you what Schneyer said about his views".  In the latter 
case, we are impliedly told that the views are so noteworthy as to motivate the first listener to 
repeat them.  We repeat the views of others less often than we express our own; typically we do 
not engage in such repetition unless there is something worthwhile, or at least interesting, about 
what was said.  At a minimum, saying "I want to tell you what Schneyer said about his views" 
tells the listener that at least two people are interested in this topic:  Schneyer and the speaker. 
 
 Third, the reportorial voice -- whose typical function is to recount events as they occur -- makes 
it appear that something has actually happened here.  In fact, all that has really happened is that 
Hooters has expressed its opinion; but the reporting of that opinion as an event ("The Hooters 
Restaurant chain said today that it will resist...") gives one the impression that one is seeing a 
play in a sporting event or a battle in a war.  It is not merely speech; it is action.  The reportorial 
style of the press release, then, serves to give the reader the impression of an objective report of 
an important event, rather than of an entirely instrumental, persuasive device the reports nothing 
but what its writer believes.  In this sense, its language is fundamentally dishonest.100 
 
 The headline and sub-headline of the release are clearly aimed at ridicule.  Hooters is cast as the 
firm parent (it "says no"), disciplining the absurd and stupid EEOC that wants Hooters to hire 
"Hooters Guys", a phrase that is clearly designed to call up a ridiculous image of a man in a 
"Hooters Girl" uniform.101  Hooters diagnoses EEOC's problem (as parents frequently do) as a 
lack of "common sense", something Hooters apparently is supposed to have in abundance. 
 
 The first sentence is designed to cast the EEOC in the role of the aggressor.  The agency is 
making "demands" designed to "drive" Hooters "out of business", while Hooters is only 
"resisting."  The choice of the word "resist" is instructive, because unlike other appropriate verbs 
("oppose", "deny", "refuse", "decline", "reject", "spurn", "balk"), that word has strong heroic 
connotations, invoking resistance to tyranny, resistance to oppression, and the Resistance to 
Fascism and Nazism.  Not only is EEOC the aggressor, then, but Hooters is the valiant warrior 
holding back the behemoth; the biblical image of David and Goliath102 is almost inescapable.  In 
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addition, the EEOC, here and throughout the release, is referred to in the singular, without 
reference to any particular human being or group of people associated with its viewpoint.  
Hooters, on the other hand, is consistently mentioned in connection with groups of individuals:  
"Hooters officials and franchise owners", "Hooters representatives", "Hooters Girls", and so 
forth.  This gives the impression that the EEOC is inhuman and monolithic, but that Hooters is 
made up of people and reflects their views. 
 
 The various documents in the press kit repeatedly refer to the BFOQ defense, in almost the same 
words.  Close facsimiles of the sentence, "A French restaurant has the right to hire only French 
waiters, and a women's exercise gym may choose to hire only female locker room attendants", 
appear no less than five times in the different parts of the press kit.103  One of these is the 
statement by Cheryl Whiting, director of training for Hooters of America, Inc., who apparently 
started "in 1987 as a Hooters Girl" but nonetheless "has more than ten years of management 
experience...in the food and beverage industry."104  Whiting's biography does not indicate that 
she has ever attended college (while it does indicate McNeil's college education),105 but her 
statement, which is devoted to the view of "working people" towards the dispute, contains the 
following sentence: 
 
 Besides, the law recognizes that some jobs require unique qualifications: to be a waiter in 
an authentic French restaurant, you can be required to be French.  It follows that to be a 
Hooters Girl, you have to be female.106 
 
 It is surely plausible that a high school graduate, especially one with extensive management 
experience, would have some familiarity the BFOQ defense;107 but it is unlikely that she would 
spontaneously and independently arrive at the same example (the French restaurant) used by 
McNeil and all of the other papers in the press kit.  We can hypothesize, therefore, that a 
deliberate decision was made to use the BFOQ and the French restaurant example in as many 
different documents as possible, in order to maximize the probability that it would find its way 
into news stories and editorials.108 
 
 In this light, it is interesting to observe the nuances of grammar and structure used in the Whiting 
statement.  Whiting's version of the BFOQ, using the colloquialisms such as "besides" and the 
impersonal second person, is clearly less formal than the other versions of that concept, which 
use more complex sentence structure and sophistication than Whiting's.  McNeil's statement, for 
example, puts it this way: 
 
  And, I think you should know that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 explicitly allows 
businesses to establish hiring rules that take into account factors such as gender or 
ethnicity when these factors are necessary to maintain the essence of a particular business.  
For example, a French restaurant has the right to hire only French waiters, and a female 
exercise club could decide to hire only female locker room attendants.  We are convinced 
that this same standard allows Hooters to hire only women for jobs as Hooters Girls.109 
 
If one were writing a play or novel in which different characters explained the same concept, it 
would be only natural to show them explaining it in different ways; but in that case the particular 
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differences given to the characters would be highly significant.110  Given that they received their 
information about BFOQs from the same source (and, indeed, that the same source probably 
wrote much of both statements), there has been a decision to have them express themselves 
differently.  McNeil, the male, college- and business school-educated Vice President in charge of 
marketing, speaks in complex and sophisticated sentences; Whiting, the female, high school-
educated former "Hooters Girl", expresses the same concepts in simpler, unsophisticated 
language and with less reliable logic.  In the community imagined by this text, male executives 
have a strong command of language and logic; female ex-"Hooters Girls" have less -- although 
they appear to have access to more information than, say, the average person on the street, who 
probably would not be aware even of the BFOQ defense. 
 
 
 
 B.  The EEOC Press Release 
 
 On December 21, 1996, six days after the Hooters press kit was distributed, the EEOC issued its 
own, short press release: 
 
 EEOC COMMENTS ON HOOTERS' PRESS OFFENSIVE 
 
 
  Washington - Any legally sophisticated employer such as Hooters is well aware that the 
EEOC is prohibited by law from publicly discussing any pending investigation.  As a 
result, we can neither confirm nor deny the existence of an ongoing investigation against 
Hooters or any other employer.  EEOC, therefore, cannot respond to the public relations 
offensive recently initiated by Hooters. 
 
  We feel it important to point out, however, that a private class action lawsuit -- in which 
the EEOC is not a party -- was brought in December 1994 by individual men who believe 
that they were discriminated against by Hooters' hiring practices.  The case is pending in 
federal court in the Northern District of Illinois (Chicago). 
 
  Given the pendency of this private action, we fail to understand what Hooters is seeking 
to accomplish through this expensive, well-orchestrated campaign other than to 
intimidate a federal law enforcement agency and, more importantly, individuals whose 
rights may have been illegally violated.111 
 
 The contrasts between this press release and the Hooters press release are striking.  In light of my 
earlier discussion, the first thing that stands out is the complete lack of any pretense of objectivity 
or reportorial style.  This press release makes no pretense of telling the facts as a reporter would -
- it is openly stating the Commission's own views.  In this sense the EEOC release is more 
rhetorically honest than the Hooters release, insofar as the reader might be misled by the implied 
objectivity of the latter. 
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 Next most striking is the position from which EEOC chooses to make its remarks:  it will not 
comment on the substance of the dispute, as it says is forbidden to do, but instead will comment 
on the fact of the Hooters release and subsequent advertising campaign.  This raises the 
interesting question of why the EEOC bothers to comment at all if it cannot comment on 
substance; surely no negative consequences would ensue from its silence on this subject.112  Yet 
this release does contain something very close to commentary on the substance.  For example, 
there are three reasons for EEOC to mention the Latuga case:  to point out that EEOC is not 
alone in its skepticism concerning Hooters's hiring practices; to suggest that Hooters's ire is 
misdirected, since the initial complaint came from private individuals; and to cast suspicions on 
Hooter's motives for launching its public relations campaign.  This is a vivid contrast to McNeil's 
statement, in which the Latuga litigation is mentioned in order to suggest that EEOC's 
investigation of Hooters's practices is entirely unnecessary, since "Men are going to get their day 
in court -- without intervention by federal bureaucrats."113 
 
 EEOC casts Hooters in an aggressive light, as Hooters casts EEOC in its own release.  The 
difference, though, is that the aggression EEOC sees in Hooters is entirely contained in Hooters's 
public relations efforts.  Hooters is a "legally sophisticated employer" engaging in a "press 
offensive", "public relations offensive", or "expensive, well-orchestrated campaign."  The choice 
of words here is designed to portray Hooters as a wealthy, powerful and well-informed 
manipulator of the media.  This contrasts with Hooters's portrayal of the scene, in which Hooters 
was the collection of gallant individuals fighting the faceless colossus represented by EEOC. 
 
 Further, EEOC clearly believes that Hooters is not just powerful, but crafty.  The press release 
suggests that Hooters's motives in engaging in its public relations efforts are to intimidate 
government agencies and individuals in order to prevent them from engaging in their legitimate 
legal pursuits.  Further, it is exploiting EEOC's legally mandated silence by making a loud noise 
when it knows EEOC cannot respond. 
 
 The agency itself, by contrast, is shown to be an evenhanded dispenser of justice.  It calls itself a 
"federal law enforcement agency," piously and demurely reminds Hooters of its legal inability to 
speak, and points out that the Commission's responsibilities apply not only to Hooters, but to 
"any other employer."  EEOC emerges as a straight-faced, calm and "untouchable" cop that will 
neither allow itself to be drawn into accusations of unfairness nor stoop to respond to ridicule of 
its actions or motives. 
 
 The reader is clearly imagined to be allied with EEOC against the manipulative tactics of 
Hooters, sympathetic to the hopes of Latuga and his co-plaintiffs, and trusting of law 
enforcement officers to do their duty.  Notably, the reader is not supposed to be a passive receiver 
of truth from the mouth of EEOC; the agency deliberately avoids giving substantive information 
that could be taken as truth.114  From this point the reader's role is to engage in further 
investigation and testing:  to look at the court case in Chicago, to look into Hooters's motivation 
and tactics, to see the whole scene anew. 
 
 In this sense, the EEOC document may be seen as coming much closer to approaching an ideal of 
"dialectic" than the Hooters documents.  Where Hooters consistently and repeatedly hammers 
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away at the same substantive points, ridiculing EEOC's efforts and pointing out the absurdity of 
the situation in objective-sounding language that is designed to be wholly believed, EEOC leaves 
the reader in a position where she must engage in further thinking and investigation, and cannot 
take EEOC's words at face value.  EEOC makes no rhetorical claims of objectivity and points out 
that Hooters is not objective either, creating a deliberate imbalance that opens a discussion 
without closing it. 
 
 
 C.  A Hooters Advertisement 
 
 As part of the advertising campaign that began simultaneously with its press conference, Hooters 
took out a number of full-page advertisements in national newspapers.  Each of these 
advertisements was designed to show, in a humorous way, the apparent absurdity of the EEOC's 
position; in legal terms, each was asserting the existence of a BFOQ for female servers at 
Hooters.  I will discuss one such advertisement here. 
 
 The central image in the advertisement, located at the left side of the middle of page and taking 
up about half its total height, is a photograph of a large, muscular, mustached man wearing a 
blonde wig, a large bra (apparently padded), a Hooters tank top and running shorts.  He is staring 
into the camera with a wild-eyed, open-mouthed grin, as though singing a long note on the word 
"hey".  In his right hand he carries a plate of food, apparently chicken wings; his left hand is 
raised to mid-waist, and the index finger is bent as if beckoning.  The top third of the page is 
taken up with the large-print, boldfaced headline, "The Latest From / THE FOLKS WHO / 
Brought You the / $435 HAMMER."  To the right of the man's image, the following text 
appears: 
 
 Government bureaucrats come up with some pretty crazy ideas -- like paying $345 for a 
hammer or spending $1.8 million researching blueberries.  Almost everybody in America 
agrees it's time to rein them in. 
 
 
 But some federal bureaucrats still don't get it.  How else to explain the equal employment 
regulators' demand that Hooters restaurants begin hiring "Hooters Guys?" 
 
 
 For a restaurant chain whose essence is the "Hooters Girls," the regulators' ideas are a 
recipe for business disaster.  Here's just some of the things Washington bureaucrats want 
Hooters to do: 
 
 
 * Teach Hooters employees to be more sensitive to "men's needs" by providing 
sensitivity training. 
 
 
 * Establish a scholarship fund to enhance job or education opportunities for men. 
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 * For the next five years, require Hooters' owners to have key business decisions 
approved by a federally mandated "administrator," who must report to the EEOC.  
 
 The government has a 100,000 case backlog of job discrimination claims.  It's hard to 
believe that replacing "Hooters Girls" with "Hooters Guys" is one of the EEOC's top 
priorities.115 
 
Beneath the man and the text, a medium-sized footer appears:  "COME ON, WASHINGTON -- 
GET A GRIP".  Beneath that, the Hooters logo appears, followed by the words, "It's time for a 
little common sense."  Finally, at the very bottom, in the smallest print on the page, appear the 
words, "Paid for by Hooters, Inc., Hooters Management Corp., and Hooters of America, Inc.", 
with the address following.116 
 
 This advertisement operates on many different levels at once, employing a variety of rhetorical 
devices.  First and most obvious is the photograph of the man in the wig and outfit.  The 
expression on his face, together with the surrounding text, show that he is supposed to be an 
absurd parody of EEOC's position.  The particular image chosen, the cross-dressing man, is 
likely to cause discomfort among viewers -- especially heterosexual males, Hooters's target 
clientele.  As I have noted elsewhere, exposure to images of ambiguous or mixed gender 
representations of men, especially when they have a gay or bisexual connotation, can be 
profoundly threatening to the identity of heterosexual males whose self-concept depends on the 
maintenance of a strong masculine persona.117  The almost psychotic look of desperate glee on 
the man's face, combined with the beckoning left hand, invite the viewer to believe that he is 
being asked to participate in a gender-bending activity of identity-crushing proportions.  Further, 
the particular man in this picture, muscular and mustached, is a far cry from the stereotypical 
image of an effeminate male -- a distinction that is threatening for two reasons.  First, if it could 
happen to him it could happen to you; second, he might be powerful enough to compel you.  
This, the picture seems to say, is the end result of hiring men at Hooters:  Your own sexuality is 
at risk. 
 
 But the photograph rests on unstated, unproven, and possibly false assumptions.  Why assume 
that men hired by Hooters would wear the same uniform as women?  If they did wear a similar 
uniform (tank tops, tee shirts and running shorts are essentially unisex clothing), why assume that 
the men would wear bras and wigs?  Why, indeed, assume that any sort of gender-bending, non-
heterosexual or ambiguous result would come at all?  If the women are dressed to sexually 
titillate men, then it might be logical for the men to be dressed to sexually titillate women.118  In 
the alternative, the women could continue to serve the function of sex appeal while the men did 
not.  The advertisement's assumptions come from Hooters's underlying assertion:  that its 
survival depends on the "Hooters Girl" concept, and that any dilution of that concept would be 
fatal.  Consequently, since the only kind of server Hooters has is a Hooters Girl, it follows that 
any man hired would be hired as a Hooters Girl; hence the absurd, threatening picture. 
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 By using this picture as the centerpiece of its advertisement, Hooters creates a link between its 
marketing strategy and American male identity.  The government's attempt to alter Hooters is 
presented as tantamount to an attempt at wholesale emasculation.  We cannot be real American 
men unless Hooters is allowed to be Hooters. 
 
 The two most prominent pieces of text in the advertisement, the only ones that can be read at 
more than arm's length, are the header "The Latest From / THE FOLKS WHO / Brought You the 
/ $435 HAMMER", and the footer "COME ON WASHINGTON -- GET A GRIP".  The header, 
which is clearly linked to the photograph (the man in the picture is "the latest from the folks") 
associates the well-known Defense Department spending debacles of the early 1980s (in which 
disproportionately large amounts of money were paid for cheap tools and supplies) with current 
EEOC antidiscrimination policies.  This analogy is striking, because there is no real connection 
between the two.  They occurred in two different agencies, following different procedural rules in 
different situations.  More significantly, the Defense Department problems originated not in the 
crazy ideas of government regulators, but in the dishonest billing practices of private defense 
contractors; the government's sin was the failure to catch the billing practices because of its own 
poor or outdated purchasing practices.119  Contrary to the text of the advertisement, "paying 
$435 for a hammer" was never an "idea" of "government bureaucrats".  In a way, then, Hooters is 
drawing our attention to the opposite of the real events:  it implies that EEOC's attempt to control 
private business is congruent with the Department of Defense's failure to control private 
business.  Since this is obviously wrong, then why make that connection?  
 
 The key here, as in many of the texts discussed in this article, is the concept of "common sense."  
The "Hooters Guy" and the "$435 hammer" are shown as similar in that they both are things with 
which the ordinary person would disagree.  In the text of the article, the reference to "spending 
$1.8 million researching blueberries" -- a transition between the "$435 hammer" and the idea of 
hiring men at Hooters -- is designed to bolster the notion that the federal government generally 
offends common sense.  The transition works this way:  The first case presents government 
officials who do not have the common sense to rein in spending; in the second, government 
officials do not have the common sense to know that a study of blueberries is not worth $1.8 
million; in the third, government officials do not have the common sense to know that Hooters 
must hire only women.  The first two deal with spending, the third does not; but the last two both 
involve things approved of (not merely neglected) by government officials. 
 
 In this way, all odd things done by the government are conflated into a single, massive loss of 
common sense.  The advertisement plays on the general sense of alienation late twentieth-century 
Americans have about their institutions in general and the federal government in particular, as 
well as the age-old distrust of the average citizen for the intelligentsia and the professional 
classes.  It may well be, for example, that spending $1.8 million on the research of blueberries 
turns out to be a useful thing, when one has considered the reasons behind the research and its 
probable benefits.  But the ordinary person, who generally would know neither the reasons nor 
the benefits, would never consider such a thing.  Stated baldly, without any of the supporting 
information, the expenditure simply looks foolish.  Yet if those in power are routinely doing 
foolish things, then all of us are in jeopardy.  Hooters presents itself as a victim of the random, 
unpredictable silliness of radical, isolated intellectuals and bureaucrats who wield dangerous 
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amounts of power.  The advertisement suggests that what happened to Hooters is waiting to 
happen to all of us unless something is done.  Consequently the footer, urging "Washington" (a 
single entity) to "get a grip" (an easy thing to do), is designed to be the cry of all outraged 
citizenry at all government shenanigans.  A restaurant chain is everyman. 
 
 The text of the advertisement, like several documents contained in Hooters's press kit,120 refers 
to three specific requests apparently made by EEOC in its conciliation offer: employee training, 
scholarship funds, and EEOC supervision.   In discussing these three references, it is important to 
remember, first, that the whole conciliation offer was apparently many times longer than these 
three items; various documents in the press kit suggest that it was 80 pages long, including 
appendices.121  Second, we should remember that no one, including Hooters, has made the 
conciliation offer public.  All we know about the offer is the very small amount that Hooters has 
made public in its press kit and advertisements. 
 
 This presents Hooters with a common problem in rhetoric:  how to be a trustworthy reporter of 
facts that are known, in detail, to the writer, but which the writer can recount only in heavily 
digested form.  This is a problem I faced myself in an earlier article, when I was discussing 
documents a lawsuit that were available only to those who actually went to the courthouse to find 
them.  In response to that problem, I said: 
 
 [T]o speak about a document in this case, I must be careful to explicate its text and 
context clearly, since my reader will not (generally) be able to verify my claims.  For 
example, I am about to recite the basic facts of the case.  To do this, I am relying on the 
fact summaries appearing in the summary judgment papers filed by the parties.  I will try 
to avoid stating any fact that is disputed, or I will point out a dispute where it occurs, but 
you are in the (possibly uncomfortable) position of relying on me to do this job well.122 
 
Hooters is in the identical position with regard to the conciliation offer.  It has exclusive access to 
the document, and is able, in a brief advertisement or press release, to give us only small pieces 
of it.  Consequently we must rely on Hooters to give us a fair representation of what that offer 
contained. 
 
 But to what extent, if at all, does Hooters present itself as a trustworthy reporter of that 
information?  We know, after all, that Hooters has an axe to grind in this matter; does it also give 
us reason to believe that it is giving us a fair presentation anyway?  It does not do the obvious 
thing, that is, making the entire conciliation offer publicly available for inspection.  Such a 
publication would have tremendous rhetorical value, because it would demonstrate Hooters's 
willingness to let the public judge the facts for themselves, without filtering.  Alternatively, 
Hooters could make explicit the fact that it is merely summarizing non-representative samples of 
a much larger and more complex offer -- if that is actually the case.  In a sense Hooters does do 
this, saying in the advertisement that the bullets represent "just some of the things Washington 
bureaucrats want Hooters to do", and repeatedly referring, in the press kit, to the length of the 
conciliation offer.  Yet that phrasing makes it appear that the samples are representative and that 
the rest of the offer is similar in tone, intent and strategy.  Of course we have no way of knowing 
whether this is the case, but it seems unlikely, given the tenor and clear intent of the 
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advertisement.  A third possibility would be to make an explicit attempt to present the EEOC's 
position in addition to Hooters's own.  There is no real evidence of such an attempt. 
 
 Consequently the relationship of the reader to Hooters is clear, and, indeed, familiar.  This is 
advertising, and we are supposed to buy what is sold.  We are given no opportunity to make an 
independent evaluation of the dispute because evaluation is not our role.  The advertiser has 
decided which version of the facts is the most effective message, and its hope is that we will 
believe that version.  This is either highly respectful or highly disrespectful of the reader.  The 
general claim of advertisers is that consumers are presumed to be mature, intelligent, and able to 
see an advertising pitch for what it is; consequently balanced information in advertising is not 
necessary -- indeed, it would be presumptuous and paternalistic to include such a balance, 
because it would imply that the consumer is not able to take care of herself.  
 
 Yet that explanation sounds like a merely updated version of caveat emptor, a broad excuse to 
exaggerate, distort the truth or simply lie.  More to the point, the nature of advertising, and of this 
ad in particular, is to withhold from the reader the very information that would allow her to make 
the mature, intelligent choice that Hooters "respectfully" permits her.123  It is possible for 
individuals to be universally suspicious of advertising and therefore not to be manipulated by it, 
but that hardly provides an ethical justification for engaging in that kind of manipulation.  It is 
not tenable to say that lying or distortion is ethical merely because the listener probably knows 
that it is going on.124  It is far more accurate to say that this advertisement treats the reader 
entirely as means to an end.  Neither the intelligence, the well-being, nor the spirit of the viewer 
is of any consequence here.  We are the device by which Hooters gets its way. 
 
 
VI. Lawyers Talking to Each Other: 
 
 the Debate in the ABA Journal 
 
 For more than ten years, the ABA Journal, published monthly and distributed to all members of 
the American Bar Association, has printed an "At Issue" column, in which current controversies 
of interest to the legal profession are debated.  The column customarily poses each controversy as 
a leading question (e.g., "Should contingency fees be abolished?") and contains one article 
arguing the affirmative and one arguing the negative.  Each article is about 500 words long, and 
is written by a lawyer, law professor, judge or similar legal professional who has some expertise 
in the area.  Typically each author is, or has been, engaged in litigation or advocacy favoring the 
result for which she argues.  Although these articles often involve policy questions, occasionally 
they involve the interpretation of the law. 
 
 This format is reassuringly familiar to the lawyers who read the column -- it resembles the type 
of appellate brief we were taught to write in law school.  Its distillation of an issue into a single 
question with either a positive or negative answer, its insistence on brevity, and its choice of 
writers predisposed to argue in favor of one side or the other, all serve to remind lawyers of their 
own view of how disputes should be discussed.  This is the world the way lawyers know it; 
consequently we automatically appreciate this way of talking, and are led to believe both that it 
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expresses something meaningful about disagreements and that it gives us a good basis for 
making decisions. 
 
 Yet there is much that can be said against such a model.  For one thing, few controversial issues 
are so simple that they can profitably be posed as a single "yes/no" question.  Such a method 
inevitably avoids the complexities involved in difficult questions, causing both reader and writer 
to imagine that the issues are considerably less difficult than they are.125 
 
 In its February, 1996 issue, about two months after Hooters held its press conference, the ABA 
Journal published an "At Issue" column with the title, "Sex Discrimination:  Does refusing to 
hire men as food servers violate the Civil Rights Act?"126  The column specifically concerned 
the EEOC investigation of Hooters (probably prompted by the press coverage), and the 
introductory paragraphs preceding the two articles specifically mentioned BFOQ as the core legal 
issue.  The affirmative argument was written by Mary Becker127 of the University of Chicago 
law school, while the negative was written by Patricia A. Casey of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer 
& Feld, who is "Hooters' attorney"128 and presumably had some advisory role in the planning of 
the press conference. 
 
 
 A.  The Essay by Mary E. Becker 
 
 Here is the first paragraph of Becker's article: 
 
  In the 1970s, Southwest Airlines dressed its stewardesses in hot pants and go-go boots, 
and ran an ad campaign with the theme, "Fly me."  Southwest argued that sex was the 
essence of its marketing to male business travelers, and that its females-only hiring policy 
was "necessary for the continued success of its image and its business."129 
 
The first thing to strike the reader about this paragraph is that it concerns neither Hooters nor 
food servers.  It is a narrative, telling the story of a series of actions by another company that 
apparently occurred twenty years ago.  A non-lawyer reading this passage might wonder what 
relevance that story has to this dispute, although there are similarities to the Hooters scenario. 
 
 But this paragraph is written by a lawyer for other lawyers, who will recognize the intent of the 
narrative:  this is going to be an argument by analogy, probably an argument from precedent.  
Even if the particular lawyer-reader is not aware of Wilson v. Southwest Airlines,130 she can 
guess how the argument will proceed.  Probably Becker is going to tell us about a court decision 
that found Southwest Airlines to have violated Title VII, and probably she is going to argue that 
the Hooters scenario is similar to the Southwest scenario.  This form of argument is so familiar to 
lawyers that we intuitively recognize the classic introductions to it and can comfortably guess at 
what is coming next.  By using this format, Becker places herself squarely within the community 
of lawyers, and informs us that it is within that community that she intends to make her case.  
More, she is saying that this is the sort of controversy that ought to be resolved by those who talk 
like lawyers, rather than those who talk like politicians or marketing directors.  Legal reasoning, 
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and especially the ancient common law tradition of argument from precedent, is a good and 
proper way to think.131 
 
 Of course there are many different ways to introduce a controlling precedent.  One could simply 
open by saying, "This case is squarely controlled by Wilson v. Southwest Airlines", or "The facts 
presented by the Hooters scenario are slightly more exotic versions of facts presented in earlier 
cases."  I think that Becker would agree with both of these statements, and both are consonant 
with the intent of her article.  Why, then, does she start by telling the story of Southwest's 
business practices and its arguments for maintaining them? 
 
 I think that this strategy serves two functions.  First, by telling a story, Becker places herself in 
that class of lawyers who know that "the life of the law is experience".132  The first thing she 
knows about Wilson is what events took place, and why they took place.  All lawyers, and 
especially academic lawyers, run the risk of giving the impression that they are so interested in 
theory that they neglect the mundane facts of life and the realistic concerns of people, especially 
people in business.  We are, indeed, routinely accused of this.133  But Becker knows not only 
what Southwest did, but why Southwest did it:  She understands the marketing motivation behind 
the business practice.  Although she has defined herself as a lawyer among lawyers, she also 
shows that she knows what non-lawyers (particularly businesses) do. 
 
 Second, this particular story emphasizes the purpose of Southwest's practices.  By the time we 
finish reading this paragraph, we understand that Southwest really was trying to use sex as a 
marketing strategy, and really did feel that it was essential to its business.  This makes Southwest 
look a great deal like Hooters, particularly because of the motivation behind the action.  Before 
we even get to the second paragraph, we are probably feeling that these two cases are parallel in 
important respects. 
 
 Is this a good way to proceed?  Any lawyer would try to stress similarities in helpful precedent, 
and Becker is putting those similarities at the front.  But is this particular way of doing it 
distracting or beguiling?  Is Becker camouflaging the facts that are more difficult to reconcile 
with Hooters?  After all, there are certainly differences between the airline industry and the 
restaurant industry, and between the two marketing approaches.  Is Becker leading us to miss 
them?  I think not:  the fact that Wilson involves stewardesses rather than waitresses, and the 
manner of the advertisements, are explicitly discussed at the very beginning.  Far from hiding 
them, Becker starts with them. 
 
 As anticipated, Becker's second paragraph continues with a summary of the court's basic holding 
in Wilson, including the crucial language that " 'sex does not become a bona fide occupational 
qualification merely because an employer chose to exploit female sexuality as a marketing tool, 
or to better [e]nsure profitability.' "134  She points out that Southwest later found another 
marketing device.  Then she produces a third paragraph that is designed to mirror her first one: 
 
  Now, a restaurant chain is arguing its business is not food but the ambiance and 
entertainment created for men by Hooters "girls."  These women usually wear tight short-
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shorts and tank tops or half-tees with a large-eyed owl on the front; some shirt backs read 
"More than a mouthful."135 
 
The parallel construction here is remarkable.  Becker emphasizes the similarity in the uniforms 
("hot pants" vs. "tight short-shorts") and marketing strategy ("Fly me" vs. "More than a 
mouthful"), as well as the similarity between the arguments of the companies ("sex was the 
essence of its marketing to male business travelers" vs. "business is not food but the ambiance 
and entertainment created for men by Hooters 'girls' ").  The effect of this well-rendered analogy 
is to persuade the reader that the important parts of the cases are identical, and that the holding in 
the one should apply to the other.  Yet all of this is accomplished in narrative form, without 
resort to overt logical argument; the story makes the argument all by itself.  This is a powerful 
rhetorical device, because the reader is led to believe that his own intelligence is drawing the 
parallels.  Also, notice the pattern of the paragraphs:  Facts-law-facts.  We are shown how one set 
of facts led to a legal conclusion, and then shown another set of facts that closely resembles it.  
Our tendency to form patterns leads us to conclude that a similar legal conclusion would follow 
the similar facts.  Again, the fact that we are lawyers is key:  lawyers believe in this common-law 
style of reasoning; Becker is fully invested in that style and thinks that we should be too.  
Becker's fourth, single-sentence paragraph fulfills our expectations:  she tells us that to find in 
favor of Hooters would require us to abandon the legal rule set forth in Wilson.136  This is 
something against which our common law respect for precedent rebels, and besides, we are 
already invested in the rightness of the Wilson decision.137 
 
 Becker then switches her focus and begins to talk about policy -- specifically, policy concerning 
women.  She points out that the defeat of Hooters would mean that some women might lose their 
jobs, and that it's even possible that Hooters would go out of business, hurting more female 
employees.  How, then, is this good for women?  She responds by denying that Hooters will go 
out of business, and then pointing out three advantageous characteristics of a changed Hooters 
following such a court decision:  "reasonable, comfortable uniforms" for female employees, a 
reduced frequency and severity of sexual harassment due to the changed environment, and 
increased job security for women who cease to appear sexually attractive as currently defined by 
culture.138  She admits that 
 
 in a world without a discriminatory Hooters, women will not be able to trade their youth, 
beauty and sex appeal for a job with good wages and (often) a lot of sexual harassment.  
But the woman who does get the job will have greater job security, as well as better 
working conditions.139 
 
 What is interesting about this passage is that the policy issues Becker discusses are the grounds 
for neither the EEOC investigation nor the current Latuga litigation, both of which have focussed 
on discrimination against men.  Becker seems to be saying that discrimination against men is not 
the real or important issue -- indeed, her article does not mention the interests of male plaintiffs 
at all.  Instead, she is concerned with the negative effects the Hooters environment has on its 
female employees.  The environment she speaks of is not the discrimination in hiring per se, but 
rather the sexually exploitative nature of the business.  She is saying that a Hooters without 
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discrimination -- by which she apparently means a Hooters without the "Hooters girl" concept -- 
will be better for women. 
 
 By thus changing her focus, Becker defines herself in two ways.  First, she is interested in policy 
in general, something she will reinforce in her last paragraphs, in which she speaks of the "broad 
societal" consequences of a victory or defeat for Hooters.  Second, she is interested (and believes 
that Title VII should be interested) primarily in the status of women in the workplace.  Her chief 
concern, which takes up the majority of the article, is the effect of the case on women.  Indeed, 
the direction and tone of the article reflect the "dominance" approach, rather than the "difference" 
approach, to equality law.140  Within this approach, the plaintiffs are disregarded because they 
suffer no real harm; no one really thinks that any specific men, or men in general, have suffered 
any genuine loss because of sex discrimination at Hooters. 
 
 The combination of these two definitions is, in one sense, quite resonant:  we want people to 
think more broadly than the individual case, and we want them to take into consideration the 
interests of those who might be "hurt" by the result.  Yet, by making the question of subjugation, 
rather than equal treatment, the center of her attention, Becker makes it seem that Title VII itself, 
and the way it has been judicially interpreted, don't matter that much after all.  Amazingly, it is 
not the interests of Hooters that vanish in this article; it is the interests of the male plaintiffs.  The 
female employees about whose putatively changed condition Becker speaks so glowingly are, 
after all, entirely hypothetical.  We do not know that Hooters will change its focus or its policies 
in response to a loss, other than by hiring men; it could easily exploit women just as much and 
still satisfy the statute.  This aspect of the essay is troubling, because in losing sight of the actual 
plaintiffs involved in the case, Becker falls prey to a criticism routinely made of lawyers, notably 
academic lawyers, and especially feminist academic lawyers:  that we are more interested in 
changing the world to suit our beliefs than we are in the fate of specific individuals.141  
 
 Finally, Becker speculates on the consequences of a win by Hooters in this case.  She returns to 
her earlier assertion that finding in favor of Hooters requires abandoning Wilson: 
 
 Think of the jobs that could become part of the sex industry were employers simply free 
to add female sexuality to any job description:  all customer-contact jobs in 
transportation, restaurants, sales, marketing, service industries, etc. 
 
  What would be the result of a Hooters victory if other employers followed the lead?  
Those in so-called women's jobs would have little job security and be subject to higher 
levels of harassment.  I suspect women might earn even less per hour than they do 
today.142 
 
Now the stakes are much higher.  Earlier, she was concerned with the effects on workers at 
Hooters itself; now, she is talking about the future of women in the American workplace.  
Previously we might have thought that following the Wilson logic was simply a matter of respect 
for precedent, an emotion intuitively felt by common law lawyers.  Now, though, it seems that 
abandoning Wilson would be more than rejecting a precedent:  it would be opening the 
floodgates for sex-specific jobs, all of which would be degrading and oppressive to the women 
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who would be called upon to fill them.  Becker now defines Wilson as the finger in the dike 
holding those waters back.  Hooters itself, and even the future women workers at Hooters, now 
shrink into insignificance.  We are talking about the very nature of sexual equality, about whether 
we will turn back the clock on the cultural meaning of Title VII itself. 
 
 But this begins to seem overwrought.  Becker's prediction reads like a dissenting opinion in an 
appellate court decision:  These are the dire consequences of the court's decision today.143  
While some dissenting opinions turn out to be prescient,144 most are exaggerating in order to 
make a point.  Further, this tactic by dissenting judges never seems entirely trustworthy:  either 
they are being careless in the way they calculate future outcomes, or they are evidencing a 
reckless disregard for the truth.  Why should we believe that Becker is right about the 
consequences of abandoning the logic of Wilson? 
 
 But we academics sometimes demand too much of our texts.  Becker, like me, is a professor who 
is used to putting careful, detailed arguments into lengthy, excruciating articles.  A 500-word 
essay is an entirely different matter, in which a detailed argument cannot be made.  It is difficult 
to be persuaded by the logic of a 500-word essay, because the author does not have the space in 
which to show all the steps in the proof.  Such a short piece must succeed based as much on its 
ethos and pathos as on its logos; claims of authority and tugs at the heartstrings are part of the 
whole.  Yet, at the same time, what a writer chooses to omit from such an essay is a valid 
criterion for evaluating the ethos she creates. 
 
 Becker's rhetoric is admirable, in my view, because of reliance on a shared history with its 
audience, its implied belief that legal culture and legal tradition can and should protect and 
perpetuate the rights of the oppressed.145  She shows herself to be (and insists that her readers 
should be) concerned with overall justice rather than with the needs of the moment.  However, 
she fails to acknowledge the validity of the concerns of Hooters and she distances herself too 
much from the actual litigants or potential litigants.  She sounds, indeed, like a professor:  talking 
about the best aspirations of the legal system and its effect on overall population, but not overly 
concerned with the actual individuals involved in particular disputes. 
 
 
 B. The Essay by Patricia A. Casey 
 
 Here is the first, single-sentence paragraph of Casey's article: 
 
  The EEOC's charge of sex discrimination against Hooters restaurants invites observers to 
muddle the legal and political issues.146 
 
This sentence accomplishes several things.  First, it makes an implied claim (never expressly 
argued in the article) that there is a distinction between legal and political issues.  Second, it 
defines Casey as someone who knows the difference between them and can explain it to others.  
Third, it implies that this distinction is an important one about which the reader should be 
concerned, but, fourth, it defines the EEOC as someone who does not understand, is not 
concerned with, or refuses to be forthright about that distinction.  Fifth, it defines the reader as 
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someone who, because of the EEOC's actions, is either already confused, or is in serious danger 
of becoming confused, about that distinction -- in other words, someone who needs instruction 
by Casey. 
 
 She has also altered the terms of the discussion:  we are not really talking about whether what 
Hooters did violate the law, nor whether "refusing to hire men as food servers violate[s] the Civil 
Rights Act"147 (the question posed by the ABA Journal) but whether legal and political issues 
have been confused.  This would be a very different sort of debate, concerned less with the 
interpretation of the law and more with the nature of thought and argument itself and the 
character of those involved in the debate.  In other words, Casey has turned the focus away from 
Hooters and towards those talking about Hooters:  herself, Becker, the EEOC, and, of course, us. 
 
 Casey's second paragraph is a mixture of pure law, opinion and innuendo: 
 
  Under the law, an employer may hire on the basis of gender (or national origin or 
religion, but never race) if sex "is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably 
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business."  For Hooters, the real issue 
turns on statutory construction and common sense:  Do you have to be female to perform 
the job of a Hooters girl?  I say yes.  Politically incorrect it may be, but unlawful it is 
not.148 
 
This is a remarkable construction.  The first sentence is a precisely correct recital of the rule, 
indeed resorting to the actual wording of the statute.  This is powerful because it appears to 
promise that Casey's argument is going to be based on the wording of the law itself -- she is 
going to draw her authority from the legislature's own words and her own ability to interpret.  If, 
as she has suggested, the debate is really about the distinction between law and politics, she is 
going to show that she understands legal side very well. 
 
 But take a closer look:  this formulation is actually too complete.  Why does she bother with the 
parenthetical explanation of the different characteristics that may be the basis of a BFOQ?  More 
importantly, why does she bother to remind us that race is never the basis of a BFOQ?  One 
recalls that Hooters' press kit included the same explanation, including two separate references to 
the fact that race cannot be a BFOQ.149  This is interesting, since apparently no one has argued 
that race (or religion or national origin) has anything to do with this case.  The mention of race 
serves to remind us that Title VII, by its own terms, appears to find something particularly 
heinous about race discrimination.  This is important because it gives the appearance of reducing 
the importance of sex discrimination: if Congress would allow BFOQs for sex but not for race, 
sex discrimination must not be as bad as race discrimination.  The implication is that even if 
Hooters has committed sex discrimination, that's not such a terrible thing.150 
 
 The second sentence of this paragraph alters the focus slightly:  now that we know the law, we 
have to interpret it.  But statutory construction by itself, apparently, is not sufficient; in addition 
we must use something called "common sense."  This is an odd thing for a lawyer to say to other 
lawyers.  How is common sense separate from statutory construction?  Surely common sense is 
one of the many tools normally used in construing statutes.151  Casey, however, implies that 
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some people (the EEOC, for example) fail to use common sense in statutory construction.  But 
more than this, by conjoining these two words with the word "and", she implies that common 
sense has a separate status that may be of equal standing with that of statutory construction.  
There are, in other words, non-lawyerly skills that are necessary to arrive at the right outcome.  If 
lawyers have lost the habit of using common sense, as she implies, then we may be less qualified 
than the ordinary person to interpret the meaning of the law.  Fortunately we have Casey, who 
knows what common sense is and how to use it.152 
 
 In asking whether "you have to be female to perform the job of a Hooters girl", Casey subsumes 
an important point in her construction.  We know that BFOQs since Johnson Controls must be 
specifically linked to the employee's ability to do the job;153 by defining the job as "the job of a 
Hooters girl", Casey takes the company's marketing strategy as part of the definition of the 
position.  One does not find "Hooters girl" among the occupational categories listed in the 
Department of Labor indexes, nor in the classifications made by newspapers or employment 
agencies.  Those entities would probably have defined the position as "waitron", "server", 
"bartender" or "maitre d'hotel".  The way she asks the question imposes the answer.  Her 
response -- "I say yes" -- has a simple power just because of her clear reliance on her own 
judgment.  It sounds very much like the sort of thing a person relying on "common sense" would 
say.  Further, it sounds more like the beginning of a political speech than like a legal argument, 
participating in the confusion Casey identifies between law and politics in this case. 
 
 The paragraph's final sentence, though, is a loaded weapon.  In the last decade or so, the words 
"politically correct" have been used almost exclusively by those who wish to deride the thing 
they describe.  Practically no one uses the term to describe himself.  People have built entire 
careers out of using the words "political correctness" to flagellate their colleagues, their political 
opponents, or anyone else with sympathies leaning to the political left.154  In popular usage, this 
term has come to denote the rigid adherence to a dogmatic code of conduct in speech and 
thought, mandated by the hypersensitivity of all those who might conceivably benefit from Title 
VII or other anti-discrimination statutes.  "Political correctness" is routinely compared to Nazi 
book-burnings, Soviet intellectual dogmatism and the red-baiting of the McCarthy era.  To call 
an idea "politically correct", therefore, is to call it narrow, mindless and intolerant.  By contrast, 
by saying that her own answer about Hooters -- which she has not yet explained or defended -- 
may be politically incorrect, Casey has already defined herself (I am not bound by dogmatism or 
silly conventions) and her opponents (anyone who disagrees with me is like a Nazi or a 
McCarthyite).  Further, she has revived the distinction between law and politics in a more sinister 
way.  Earlier, when she said that one risked muddling legal and political issues, we might have 
believed that the "politics" she was describing was the politics of honest people of goodwill 
disagreeing about matters of principle.  Now, however, we see that she means the politics of the 
crazy left as opposed to the rest of America, including herself in the latter.  The "politically 
correct", she is telling us, are at odds with the law. 
 
 It is not until the third paragraph that Casey's actual argument begins.  The core of this argument 
is an idea of considerable legal and intellectual merit, namely that a business does not have a 
single and exclusive "core" essence but is more complicated.  Consequently, to say that the 
"food" aspect is more important than the "sex" aspect of Hooters, and therefore is the primary 
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relevant determinant of what constitutes the "job" of a server at Hooters, is to greatly 
oversimplify an intricate problem.  She compares Hooters to Playboy magazine and the 
Rockettes dancers:  in each case there is a non-sexual aspect to the business which might 
conceivably be called primary or essential, but Casey implies that focusing exclusively on such 
an aspect to the expense of the obvious sexual intent of the enterprise would be ludicrous. 
 
 More than this, she argues that this is really a dispute over who should be entitled to define what 
the essence, or defining characteristic of a business.  To Casey the answer is obvious:  "Don't 
these businesses have the right to decide exactly what products to offer on the market?"155  
While at some points she suggests that the question is so amorphous that no one knows what the 
essence of the business actually is, she wants there to be deference to businesses.  It will be noted 
that such a rule, if taken literally, would have an odd effect in discrimination cases:  If any 
business has the right to define what its primary, essential aspects are simply by saying so, and if 
government regulators and courts ought to defer to that determination, then businesses can create 
BFOQs at their convenience whenever faced with a lawsuit.  Becker's warning about BFOQs 
appearing everywhere might seem a real danger, given Casey's position. 
 
 Casey's argument concerning the authority to speak about the essence of a business has another 
agenda, however:  to discredit the opinions of the EEOC.  Consider the following chain of 
statements about the agency: 
 
  The EEOC seems to believe that a business can have only one defining characteristic, or 
"essence." . . . And who is the EEOC to say that only one of the many elements of 
Hooters is the essential, defining one? 
 
 . . . 
 
  Hooters' case demonstrates the limitations of the EEOC's expertise -- quite simply, the 
agency lacks the business acumen necessary to determine what elements are "essential"  
to an enterprise.  Indeed, it is currently making a similar mistake in a case against the 
Lillie Rubin clothing stores, in which it is asking the women's store to hire men as well as 
women to assist patrons in the dressing rooms.  (According to an EEOC spokesperson, 
women might "love" to be fitted by male attendants.)156 
 
In this string of quotations I have omitted the details of Casey's legal argument in order to 
highlight the non-legal, rhetorical position she is staking out.  She is arguing not merely that 
EEOC has reached the wrong result, but that it has no business arriving at any result, because it is 
not competent to judge what is "reasonably necessary for to the normal operation of that 
particular business."157  What constitutes the normal operation of the business is a business 
decision, and isolated ("politically correct"?) government bureaucrats are in no position to 
second-guess those decisions.  Worse, these bureaucrats are so separated from the rest of "us" 
that they have lost any ability to use "common sense."  
 
 The Lillie Rubin anecdote, and especially the isolated, parenthetical, decontextualized quotation 
from an anonymous "spokesperson", are designed to show that the judgments of the EEOC are 
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untrustworthy because they do not reflect what ordinary people would recognize from ordinary 
experience.158  Of course the Lillie Rubin and Hooters scenarios are not parallel.  If the EEOC 
has made a mistake with Lillie Rubin, it is a mistake that relates to understanding the needs of 
gender-related privacy.  This mistake, though arguably more fundamental, is of a different 
character than misapprehending the essential nature of Hooters's business.  In this sense, using 
EEOC's judgment in the Lillie Rubin case as a way of discrediting its judgment in Hooters is not 
entirely honest.  Yet it permits her to create a general picture of EEOC that is helpful to her 
position:  she defines the agency as unrealistic, pig-headed, isolated, inexperienced and 
fundamentally stupid.  Add to this the implied charge that EEOC is "politically correct" 
(dogmatic, narrow, fanatical), and the reader wants to conclude that its judgments are worthless. 
 
 This is, perhaps, the sort of picture a contemporary politician might paint of an opponent in a 
campaign speech; in fact it closely resembles the pictures several politicians have recently 
painted of several government agencies.159  It is also the sort of picture a litigator might paint of 
an opposing party or an unfriendly witness in a closing argument to the jury.160  Is this a 
legitimate way of talking, though?  Does it foster the kind of thinking we would like to have or 
the kind of community we would like to create?  I am inclined to be skeptical of this use of 
language.  Casey is writing about a difficult and subtle point in discrimination law that can have 
tremendous consequences for the employer, the employees and potential applicants.  She is 
describing the agency charged with enforcing discrimination law, whose supposed argument, 
though possibly incorrect, would certainly be legitimate and well-taken.  The logic of her own 
substantive argument shows that a sense of the complicated and the ambiguous is absolutely 
necessary to sort out this dispute, which belies her earlier assertion that "common sense" is at the 
core of the problem.  Yet she treats EEOC as though it is missing the obvious and the simple, as 
though this really is a matter of common sense.  In Casey's version of the story, the agency and its 
lawyers are not intelligent minds who are to be taken seriously.  This conversation is not 
designed to be a dialogue, or, if it is, the EEOC is not going to be the one with whom Casey 
speaks.161 
 
 Also, what does it mean to say that an issue depends on "common sense", and then prove that it 
actually depends on a subtle understanding of the shifting definitions of the identity or essence of 
an enterprise?  On the one hand, declaring that one is going to use common sense begins to build 
a community with the reader, because the reader, who imagines that he has common sense, feels 
that he will be participating in the problem-solving that is about to begin.  On the other hand, if 
common sense is what's needed, which all of us (except perhaps the EEOC) have, then why do 
we need Casey to explain the matter to us?  Does she have more common sense than we do?  Of 
course she does not really believe in the use of pure common sense here, and her reasoning is, as 
I have said, rather subtle and, in places, elegant.  The device of claiming the mantle of common 
sense while engaging in subtle analysis has the effect of causing the reader to believe that Casey's 
difficult conclusions are not difficult at all.  It is, at least to that extent, dishonest. 
 
 Casey's last paragraph changes the subject, and contains her only mention of the Wilson 
precedent: 
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  And don't tell me about flight attendants unless you are prepared to argue that sexiness is 
just as important as safe and timely travel to your next business trip.  Hooters can argue 
that its patrons care as much -- or more -- about being in the presence of the Hooters girls 
as they do about the burgers and beer.162 
 
The difficulty with this argument as an argument is that Southwest Airlines presumably could 
have made, and apparently did make, the same case for its passengers.  One has only to harken 
back to 1960s jokes about stewardesses (most of them explicitly using the "Fly Me" slogan) to 
postulate that male business travelers selected Southwest in those days specifically because of the 
sex appeal of the flight attendants.  The argument is misleading in another way:  by comparing 
sexiness to safety, Casey presents the illusion of an unanswerable argument.  Of course no one 
would knowingly fly on an unsafe airline just to see attractive flight personnel.  But it is equally 
true that no one would eat in an unsafe restaurant (with food of questionable wholesomeness, or 
where gang wars were known to erupt) just to see attractive servers.  But safety was never the 
issue with Southwest, just as is not with Hooters; neither business marketed itself as especially 
safe. 
 
 The syntax of this paragraph is also worth comment.  For one thing, it is flip:  "And don't tell me 
about flight attendants..."  The tone of the sentence suggests that flight attendants are just an 
annoying afterthought that no reasonable person would discuss.  Yet flight attendants involve the 
most important court precedent for this case, their jobs have many similar functions to those of 
servers, and they too have been used as deliberate sexual objects by their employers.  The cases 
seem to be very close.  This, too, is less than a perfectly forthright form of argument:  Casey 
takes the precedential argument that is most harmful to her case and treats it as though it is not 
even worth considering.  This form of argument would not be useful to her if she were writing to 
a judge who was familiar with the precedent; then she would have to argue about Wilson 
seriously.  This passage, then, is aimed at a comparatively ignorant audience -- yet this is the very 
audience whose "common sense" Casey praises elsewhere. 
 
 Further, the form of this sentence -- do not discuss X unless you first willing to say Y -- imposes 
an artificial limitation on debate.  It cuts off the speech of the other -- whether that other be 
Becker, the EEOC or the reader.  The imposition of silence is another example of what I would 
call "bad rhetoric", especially in the context of a point that is being blithely tossed off as an 
afterthought.  Casey does not want to engage in a discussion of this issue in its full  complexity, 
even as she demonstrates the skill with which she can handle complex issues.  Dialectic, that is, 
the give and take minds involved in honest disagreement, is not valued in this world.  And if the 
reader is not supposed to speak, and is supposed to use "common sense" only to the extent and 
only in the precise way that Casey wants, what is the role of the reader here?  Not, surely, an "end 
in herself."  We, like the EEOC, are means to Casey's end.  This lawyer is a litigator, and winning 
is what counts. 
 
 The Becker and Casey essays, then, provide us with two different ways in which lawyers might 
talk about sex discrimination.  Becker's presentation is clearly that of a professor; Casey's is 
clearly that of a litigator.  Both are women, and much as we might like to disregard that fact, it is 
nearly impossible to ignore in this context.  We are talking, after all, about discrimination based 
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on sex, and women have traditionally been the victims of such discrimination; yet this particular 
case does not involve discrimination against women.  The fact that the writers are women adds a 
level of complexity to the discussion. 
 
 How do these lawyers talk about sex discrimination?  Becker bases her position on argument 
from analogy and common law reasoning, while Casey (who also uses argument by analogy) 
bases her position on common sense and a political notion of the proper way to make decisions 
about business.  Becker's position is rooted in public policy, but it is the public policy designed to 
help women, the traditional victims of sex discrimination, rather than the men who are 
supposedly the victims here.  Casey's position is rooted in the notion of competence and a firm 
belief that government agencies are not competent.  It is also based on a skepticism of left-
leaning, academic thought (such as Becker's).  It does not concern itself with the interests of 
women, nor with those of men who are the victims of discrimination, but rather with the 
economic efficiency of business.  Finally, while Becker's argument invites the reader to engage in 
the same sort of analysis from precedent that she does, Casey's seems to demand a sort of 
unconditional acceptance.163 
 
 
VII.  People Talking:  Editorials in the Popular Press 
 
 Lawsuits and other legal disputes generate waves and ripples in their communities.  Journalists, 
commentators, novelists, dramatists and poets create rich bodies of literature inspired by famous 
trials.  This literature creates a textual community of its own, distinct from (but interactive with) 
the rhetorical constitution of the lawyers, judges and parties themselves.  As noted above, there is 
an entire field of scholarship devoted to examining the way law and legal disputes are 
represented in literature and popular culture.164  Ed Cohen has ably demonstrated how the 
journalistic accounts of a trial can completely alter the nature of the dispute and the community's 
relationship to it.165  Even without this scholarship, a cursory observation of the texts concerning 
the recent trials of O.J. Simpson would be convince any of us that the justice system and the 
media exist in close symbiosis.166  
 
 The many editorials written in the month following Hooters's press release show a remarkable 
variation in style, sophistication and insight.  Some analyze the issue in great detail, some joke in 
single-sentence bullets, some engage in extended displays of irony.167  Among so many, the 
choice of any single editorial upon which to comment is nearly random.  One could find 
meaningful and interesting things to say about almost all of them.  I have selected, therefore, two 
which seem to me to have been written by especially talented commentators, appearing in 
influential publications or venues, and on opposite sides of the question. 
 
 
 A. The Editorial by James Bovard. 
 
 One of the most influential editorials appeared in the Wall Street Journal on November 17, 1995, 
two days after the Hooters press conference.168  The Journal's actual news coverage of the press 
conference, printed November 16, was essentially nonexistent; it consisted of a two-sentence 
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summary in the lower right-hand corner of an article about Newt Gingrich on page 20.169  
Consequently the thousand-word editorial by James Bovard contained the only detailed 
information the newspaper's readers received about the dispute between the EEOC and Hooters.  
This editorial was widely read and widely commented on; it resulted in an apparent flood of 
mail.170 
 
 Bovard is a well-known journalist and commentator who has written several books, all of them 
highly critical of the federal government.171  His work generally reflects a distaste for regulation, 
protectionism, and most other government action that impacts on the free market or the internal 
workings of business.172  It is not surprising, therefore, that he disagrees with the EEOC's 
position.  How he goes about telling us this, however, is surprising. 
 
 Here is the opening of Bovard's editorial: 
 
  "Hi there.  My name is Bruce and I'll be your Hooters Girl tonight."  This could be the 
script for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's latest civil rights triumph. 
 
  The EEOC is on the verge of destroying the persona of one of America's fastest-growing 
restaurant chains.  It is demanding that Hooters restaurants -- home of the notorious 
"Hooters Girls" -- impose a hiring quota, guaranteeing that at least 40% of all the servers, 
bartenders and hosts hired are male.  The EEOC claims that Hooters owes at least $22 
million in back pay to guys who never even worked at its restaurants.  And it also is 
demanding that the restaurant chain revise the concept of Hooters and make it gender-
neutral.173 
 
The opening paragraph is satirical, reminiscent of the Hooters advertisement discussed earlier; 
indeed, the Wall Street Journal page containing the editorial also contains a small copy of the 
photograph that is so central to the advertisement.174  We are asked, again, to imagine that 
EEOC's position results in an absurd picture, the male "Hooters girl."  Further, as in the 
advertisement, there are cues implying a threat to male sexuality:  the juxtaposition of a male 
name and the term "Hooters Girl" creates the same tension.175  By calling this a "civil rights 
triumph", Bovard implies that the goal of the EEOC is to create exactly this sort of environment, 
in which sexualized gender roles are confused or reversed.  
 
 The second paragraph purports to be a summary of EEOC's proposals concerning Hooters, 
beginning with a sentence using the interesting phrase, "destroying the persona".  Despite its 
awkwardness (it would have been easier simply to say that the EEOC is about to destroy the 
restaurant chain itself) the phrase has a special impact.  "Persona" refers to something beyond the 
mere economic success of the business:  a persona is an identity, perhaps a soul; it is something 
intimate and, well, personal.176  Its destruction seems like a more complete and spiritual sort of 
loss than the loss of revenue.  Further, destroying a persona is clearly something we would not 
want a government to do:  it represents government interference with the individual on a 
fundamental level. 
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 The second paragraph also contains a number of cues or signals defining the tone, ethos and 
politics of Bovard's voice.  The term "hiring quota," for example, is this decade's code for 
government unfairness and left-wing radicalism; it is used by conservatives (as the term "political 
correctness" is used) as a way of characterizing their political opponents.  This quota is to be 
"imposed", implying interference, hostility and tyranny.  The phrase, "guys who never even 
worked at its restaurants" serves a double purpose:  first, the deliberate informality of the words 
"guys" and "even" cues the reader to imagine that the common people, or their outlook, is on 
Hooters's side.  Second, this phrasing gives a sharper impression of the unfairness of the demand:  
someone will be receiving something for nothing.  The word "demanding", used twice in this 
short paragraph, casts the EEOC as being unwilling to compromise or negotiate in good faith; 
reasonable people don't make demands.  This is at least an exaggeration, since a conciliation 
offer is, at most, a bargaining position rather than a demand. 
 
 The bulk of Bovard's editorial, taking up thirteen of its seventeen paragraphs, is devoted to a 
narrative of the investigation and negotiation process between EEOC and Hooters.  The use of 
narrative gives the editorial (like the Hooters press release) the feeling of reportage rather than 
opinion.  When I tell a story, naturally I give my own slant on it, but the act of saying "this came 
before that" may lead you to believe that I am giving you the unvarnished truth.177  Similarly, 
Bovard is telling a story which has the earmarks of a simple recitation of facts, although it is 
located in the editorial section of the newspaper, framed on both ends by his opinions, and (as 
shall be seen) involves an unbalanced view of the facts.  It allows him to present himself as 
someone who is telling us what happened, rather than trying to convince us of something -- 
indeed, it contains the implied message that we can be convinced simply by being told what 
happened.  This is a tempting message, because it is based on the emotionally appealing notion 
that there are perceptions about the world that we all share, so that given the same information 
we would all respond in the same way.  Bovard places himself and the reader in a community 
that is so unified that the mere telling of a story leads them to the same conclusions; what a 
satisfying destruction of boundaries!178  He places the EEOC squarely outside of this 
community.  
 
 One of the interesting aspects of Bovard's narrative is the amount of detailed, apparently inside 
information that it includes.  There are details -- specifics of Patricia Casey's negotiations with 
the EEOC, names of officials involved in the investigation, quotations from the conciliation offer 
-- which do not appear in any of the documents released by Hooters or the EEOC, and which 
cannot be found anywhere else in the news reports or editorials written on this subject (except in 
those articles that explicitly refer to Bovard as their source).  I infer that Bovard interviewed 
someone inside Hooters (possibly Casey, whom he quotes directly) and received access to 
negotiation documents or at least some detailed summaries of their contents.  This gives him yet 
another mark of authenticity and believability:  he knows things that the rest of us don't know.  
By reading Bovard's piece, I learn things that I did not find anywhere else, because nowhere else 
did I have access to the information.  Because of the respect we tend to give to the opinions of 
experts and others who have superior information, it is only natural that we want to believe 
Bovard.  Yet nowhere does he tell us how he came to know so much, nor point to documents we 
could review in order to come to our own conclusions -- although we can infer, from other 
comments he makes, that he has conducted phone interviews.  As suggested above, such a voice 
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does not invite the reader to be an independent, intelligent mind; we are not given the opportunity 
to reach conclusions different from Bovard's. 
 
 Here is the first paragraph of this long narrative:  
 
  The EEOC's anti-Hooters vendetta began not in response to any complaint from a 
disgruntled male job applicant but solely to an Oct. 22, 1991, charge by EEOC 
Commissioner Ricky Silberman.  EEOC regulations allow any commissioner to accuse 
any company of discrimination, after which EEOC investigators seek supporting 
evidence.  Ms. Silberman, now the executive director of the Congressional Office of 
Compliance, did not return repeated phone calls seeking comment.179 
 
At the outset, we are told that this was not a real investigation or law enforcement operation, but 
a vendetta -- that is, a private war or feud.  Before we learn what the EEOC actually did, or how 
it went about it, we are told that its action was a grudge against Hooters rather than anything 
legitimate.  Also, notice that the word "vendetta" is so placed as to avoid the necessity of proving 
that there was a vendetta; in order to get to the verb and object of the sentence, the reader 
assumes that the vendetta exists.  In evidentiary terms, the sentence "assumes facts not in 
evidence."180  Further, this paragraph tells us that the entire project was internal to the EEOC, 
initiated by an accusation by a commissioner of the agency (no reasons are suggested for why 
Silberman might have made such a charge) who essentially ordered investigators to go out and 
seek evidence supporting the accusation.  In this text the entire process seems fundamentally 
unfair; law enforcement officers are supposed to investigate and then accuse, not the other way 
around.  The process as Bovard describes it sounds like the Inquisition or the Star Chamber. 
 
 Also note how the entire matter is made personal:  it was the grudge of one particular person, 
Ricky Silberman, that started all this.  By then telling us that Silberman has left the EEOC and 
that she has not returned his phone calls, Bovard makes it appear that she started the fire and then 
ran away to let it burn without her; he paints her as both vindictive and irresponsible.  She also 
appears cowardly, as the line about the phone calls infers that she fears to face the light of public 
criticism.181  Near the end of the article, Bovard quotes an unnamed "former high-ranking EEOC 
official" as saying, " 'The women attorneys [at the EEOC] are hot to do this case because they 
want to bust up a sexist restaurant chain.  They . . . want to get at this wicked institution.' "182  
Still later, Bovard compares the EEOC action to "the way temperance movement sisters wielded 
their axes a hundred years before".183  The anonymous testimony, the picture the temperance 
sisters, and the image of the vindictive Silberman at the beginning of the editorial, create a 
picture of crazed, fanatical women, devoid of common sense, abusing the law to get their way.  
The word "hot" suggests a sexual passion behind the fanaticism.  Interestingly, then, part of this 
editorial's power rests on its caricature of the motives, abilities and rationality of women 
professionals.184 
 
 The next two paragraphs of the narrative describe the arguments Hooters made, early in the 
investigation process, to dissuade EEOC: 
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  Hooters informed the EEOC early on in the agency's investigation that only women were 
hired for these positions because the "primary function" of the Hooters Girls was 
"providing vicarious sexual recreation."  The Girls' "uniforms are designed to tempt and 
titillate, consisting of short shorts and either low cut tank tops or half shirts, which are to 
be worn as form fitting as possible, and the Girls are expected to enhance the titillation by 
their interaction with customers.  They are to flirt, cajole and tease the patrons." 
 
 Sex Appeal  
 
  Hooters lawyer Patricia Casey wrote to the EEOC:  "The business of Hooters is 
predominantly the provision of entertainment, diversion, and amusement based on the sex 
appeal of the Hooters Girls."  The Civil Rights Act of 1964 specifies that a company can 
discriminate among job applicants based on Bona Fide Occupational Qualifications 
(BFOQ).  The Playboy Club won repeated court victories in the 1970s and 1980s when 
sued over its female-only Bunny policy.  But throughout the EEOC's investigation of 
Hooters, the agency ignored the company's hiring rationale.185 
 
Here Bovard moves from (1) Hooters's description of itself and its business, to (2) Casey's legal 
interpretation of that business, (3) the BFOQ standard, (4) the parallel example of the Playboy 
Club, and (4) EEOC's alleged reaction.  The first three steps move in the opposite direction from 
that of a legal argument, in which we would expect to begin with the statute, then move into the 
facts and their legal meaning under the statute.  Indeed, it is interesting to note that the BFOQ, 
the entire legal basis of the dispute, does not appear until the fifth paragraph of the editorial, not 
only after Hooters's and Casey's arguments but also after the innuendo concerning Ricky 
Silberman and the more flagrant of the EEOC's proposed remedies.  Thus Bovard implies that the 
law itself is less important than the relief sought, the conspiracy behind the investigation, and the 
way Hooters operates.  He shows us a dispute which apparently is really about a battle between 
individuals in the agency and Hooters's marketing strategy, in which the law is merely a tool or 
weapon used in that dispute.  Further, by placing the BFOQ after two quotations stating the 
"primary function" of the Hooters Girls and the predominant business of Hooters, Bovard seems 
to show the statutory defense growing out of those descriptions:  having been told what Hooters 
is and does, the reader is led to see the statute as a label or explanation of those facts.   By 
contrast, had Bovard started with the BFOQ, the reader would then be led to weigh whether the 
Hooters Girls fit its definition. 
 
 The reference to the Playboy Club poses an example of the BFOQ that appears to support 
Hooters's case, rather than mentioning the Wilson decision that would probably appear to 
undermine it.  In Bovard's world, the primary, perhaps the classic concrete example of a BFOQ is 
that of the Playboy Bunny, a job that appears to be substantially identical to the Hooters girl.  
Yet, as discussed earlier, the "repeated court victories" of the Playboy Club led to only two 
published decisions, by tribunals having essentially no precedential authority, in tandem with 
another decision that would seem to severely undermine them.186  To refer to these cases as if 
they were the last word in BFOQ jurisprudence is less than honest. 
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 To end these paragraphs with the assertion that EEOC "ignored" Hooters's rationale is a powerful 
device.  Bovard has sketched a transition from Hooters's rationale to the law and its application.  
By shifting immediately to the EEOC's reaction, and characterizing it in such an extreme way 
(surely the EEOC performed more analysis than merely to "ignore" Hooters's argument for three 
years), Bovard implies that EEOC has ignored not only Hooters's hiring practices, but the statute 
and precedents as well.  He has so structured his description that the law, the reader and Bovard 
himself are all allied in support of Hooters's position; abruptly, the EEOC, through either malice 
or stupidity, is outside of that alliance. 
 
 In these paragraphs we also see Bovard's access to documents from the negotiation process itself.  
They contain exact quotations from letters by Hooters and Casey to the EEOC; they remind us 
both that Bovard has a lot of information behind him and that we have access to none of it.  They 
also give prominence to Hooters's arguments in this dispute.  By contrast, while giving much 
space to the remedies proposed by EEOC (which he believes to be absurd), Bovard says almost 
nothing about the legal or factual rationale for its position.  EEOC's entire argument is 
summarized in one sentence:  "In September of 1994, after sampling an unknown number of 
happy hours and Buffalo wings, the EEOC decreed that the business of Hooters was food, and 
that 'no physical trait unique to women is required to serve food and drink to customers in a 
restaurant.' "187  This characterization makes it appear that EEOC is acting peremptorily, without 
reason or attention to facts that should be obvious.  By giving detailed reasons for one side but 
not the other, Bovard gives the impression that only one side has reasons. 
 
 In the remaining eight paragraphs of this narrative, Bovard focusses all his attention on the 
various conciliation offers and Hooters's and Bovard's own responses to them.   He describes, in 
what I must call fascinated detail, different elements of the remedies proposed by EEOC and how 
specific amounts are to be calculated and allocated.  The remedies and procedures he describes 
occur in this order:  (1) assembling a list of men alleged to have been victims of discrimination; 
(2) setting up a settlement fund for those victims; (3) the method of calculating the amount of 
award for each victim; (4) advertisements by Hooters to inform alleged victims of the availability 
of claims; (5) EEOC's method of verifying claims; (6) altering the balance of males and females 
in Hooters's workforce; (7) establishment of a fund to enhance skills, opportunities and education 
of males; and (8) Hooters's objections to the settlement fund and EEOC's response with specific 
numbers.188  
 
 Bovard has essentially nothing good to say about the EEOC's position, methods or attitude 
related to any of the remedies.  His central substantive argument, either made expressly or 
implied in the syntax used to describe the EEOC's positions, is that EEOC has based nearly all of 
its remedies on unwarranted or false factual assumptions.  Different versions of this substantive 
argument appear repeatedly throughout the narrative.  For example, he quotes Patricia Casey as 
saying: 
 
 "They just wanted to see every single application that had a man's name on it -- even 
though many of the applications could have been for kitchen jobs, such as cook or 
dishwasher.  If the guy wrote at the top that he would accept any position, or wrote 
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nothing in that space, then the EEOC officials" ludicrously concluded that he was 
applying for a female-only position.189 
 
Elsewhere, Bovard says that the EEOC "effectively assumed that after a guy applied for a job at 
Hooters he applied nowhere else and sat by the phone for over half a year, waiting for a Hooters 
call."190  In describing the suggestion that Hooters advertise to alert men who unsuccessfully 
attempted to apply for jobs to the availability of damages, Bovard says: 
 
 Since most restaurants do not keep job applications for more than one year, the EEOC-
mandated campaign will provide a windfall for perjurers.  It would be cheaper and more 
honest simply to require that Hooters restaurants open their cash registers and invite men 
off the street to come in and grab a handful of bills.191 
 
Bovard says that EEOC's method of verifying the authenticity of claims will be "primarily by 
checking the postmark, to make sure that it was mailed before the deadline for the claims."192  In 
describing the method used to calculate the size of the proposed claims fund, Bovard says that 
the EEOC "laboriously concocted an 'average male shortfall' for each Hooters restaurant -- based 
on the convenient assumption that half of the hires should have been male."193 
 
 The argument underlying these express and implied comments -- that EEOC's factual 
assumptions are not supported by the known facts -- is the sort of valid criticism that can and 
ought to be made.  Yet we would normally expect to see such an argument couched in terms of 
the refuting evidence.  For example, in the passage referencing Casey's comments above, Bovard 
could have said something like this:  "The anecdotal evidence suggests that many applications by 
men which do not specify a position are for non-server positions; in fact, as many as 40% of men 
apply for 'back-of-the-house' jobs."194  Where he criticizes the assumptions concerning how long 
an applicant would have remained unemployed, he might say, "In fact, the average man who 
applies for a restaurant position applies for several such positions, and is typically able to find 
employment after a few weeks of searching."  Where he disbelieves the assumption that half of 
Hooters's employees would or should be male, he could suggest that "a more reasonable 
assumption, given what we know of male and female employment rates in the restaurant 
industry, would be that a lower percentage of the Hooters workforce would be male."  Even if 
Bovard lacked access to any of the hard data on these points, he could still make conjectures as to 
what a rigorous study of the information would show.  He might, for example, say, "Although I 
do not actually know the number of restaurant jobs for which the average out-of-work man 
applies, I'll bet that an actual study would reveal that such men apply for an average of four or 
five jobs."  He could then criticize EEOC for any failure to conduct such an actual study.  I infer 
that Bovard believes that the evidence, if gathered, would support something like the 
propositions I have outlined. Yet, remarkably, his express and implied criticisms of EEOC's 
assumptions contain no refuting facts at all, nor any conjectures as to what those facts probably 
are.  What are we to make of this? 
 
 The editorial omits the facts refuting EEOC's assumptions because the existence or nonexistence 
of those facts is unimportant to the rhetorical community being created by this text.  If we were 
supposed to care about the evidence, then the evidence would be supplied.  But this editorial isn't 
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really about proof or disproof, any more than it is really about interpreting the law.  It is about a 
fundamental division imagined to exist between two discordant segments of society:  the 
feminists, bureaucrats and academics on the one hand, and the common people, Hooters, Casey 
and Bovard on the other.  All of the descriptions of the EEOC's suggested remedies define the 
agency as being without the habits of mind that ordinary, sensible people have -- the agency, and 
all those who support it, are outside of the "normal" community. 
 
 The concluding paragraphs of the editorial contain clear expressions of Bovard's opinion.  As I 
have indicated, one of his last paragraphs compares EEOC to temperance sisters smashing up a 
bar.  Finally he says: 
 
  Civil rights crusades have gone from allowing blacks to sit at lunch counters to allowing 
government employees to dictate the cup size of the person who serves lunch.  The 
EEOC's attack on Hooters is a direct attack on the First Amendment's Freedom of 
Association.  Hooters, which has been characterized as a "Playboy Club for Rednecks," 
does no harm and the Hooters Girls receive much larger tips than waitresses at many 
other restaurants.  Yet, because a handful of EEOC officials believe it is reprehensible for 
a restaurant to use titillation to sell beer and greasy food, the weight of the federal 
government is falling on Hooters' head.195 
 
This last paragraph has a complex system of meaning, and works on several levels at the same 
time.  The comparison between the civil rights battles of four decades past and contemporary 
discrimination disputes is common; generally, as here, the writer is trying to suggest that 
contemporary civil rights efforts are less noble and less sensible than older ones.196  The word 
"crusades", in this context, ironically suggests how the mighty have fallen: once we were 
crusaders, now we're measuring brassieres.  But look at the particular comparison being drawn:  
allowing blacks to sit at a lunch counter vs. controlling the "cup size" of the person who serves 
the lunch.  A moment's reflection will reveal that both were contained in the original version of 
the Civil Rights Act; that is, discriminating based on sex in the hiring of servers was forbidden 
from the start.  Indeed, the protection for employees was broader than for patrons, since Title VII 
forbids sex discrimination while Title II doesn't.197  Further, one might argue that protecting 
employees is more important than protecting patrons, since the former protects people's 
livelihoods while the latter protects only their convenience.  Also, the core of the criticism 
contained in these two sentences -- that government officials shouldn't dictate who can work in a 
restaurant, and that the policy infringes on the freedom of association -- are precisely the 
criticisms that could be, and indeed have been, made of Title VII and Title II themselves.198  Yet 
Bovard's phrasing suggests that he is criticizing some new development not contemplated by the 
original statute, because his grammar implies that evolution has taken place. 
 
 The last two sentences of the paragraph take Bovard in a slightly different direction.  From an 
argument decrying our fallen values and pointing out a possible constitutional argument, he now 
turns to what appears to be a practical or moral argument.  First we are told that Hooters does no 
harm and has some benefit for the workers;199 then we are told that all of the trouble is caused 
by the agendas of a few isolated officials.  These two points both have resonant and powerful 
roots.  To say that someone "does no harm" touches our belief that the law should control that 
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which is harmful, not that which is simply distasteful or unpleasant.  The sentence also contains a 
deprecating reference to Hooters -- a "Playboy Club for Rednecks" is surely a small, unimportant 
thing that should be beneath the law's notice.  The wording of the law, and its interpretation by 
the courts, vanishes altogether; what's important is that this is a small and harmless thing. 
 
 The last sentence refers to the important argument, alluded to earlier in the editorial and 
discussed in this article, that the real issue is whether the selling of sexuality is legitimate in a 
culture that has tried to outlaw sex discrimination in employment.  Bovard suggests, here and 
elsewhere, that the EEOC is masking the real motivation behind its investigation because an 
honest reading of Title VII does not show any overt prohibition on such businesses, and, indeed, 
the existence of the BFOQ defense suggests that such businesses may be expressly permitted by 
the statute.  It is an odd way, though, to end an editorial whose main text has concerned EEOC's 
remedies and calculation methods.  Bovard could have written a very convincing editorial about 
the dangers of hiding the real issue, about the need to have an explicit debate about the 
underlying problem, and predicting the result of such a rigorous debate.  But this is not his 
argument, nor is it the intent of this sentence.  This sentence, like most of the editorial, is 
designed to show the alarming behavior of a small group of isolated bureaucrats intent on 
furthering their own fanatical beliefs.  Indeed, the whole paragraph serves that purpose:  the first 
two sentences show how unworthy current EEOC officials are to fill the shoes of their forbears; 
the third shows that they are so unrealistic and obsessed as to pick on a harmless insect; the last 
shows that they will stop at nothing to get their way. 
 
 Although this editorial is entitled "The EEOC's War on Hooters", its true subject is a war that 
odd, radical lawyers are supposedly waging on all of us.  The true battleground here is the 
question, "What is the mainstream, and who is in it?"  This rhetoric defines EEOC lawyers as 
being out of the mainstream, and defines Bovard and Hooters within it.  Bovard asks the reader 
to join him in this mainstream community, and to reject and ostracize those outside it.  As in 
other texts we have seen, the basis for joining his community is not facts or law, but common 
sense, a quality imagined to exist in all people and independent of education or reflection.  We 
are asked to join Bovard because the over-educated have taken control of the government and are 
about to do horrible things to all of us.  We are not expected to form our own opinions, and are 
not given the information with which to do it; what's important is whose side we are on; this is 
war, after all. 
 
 
 B.  The Radio Commentary by Laura Archer Pulfer. 
 
 So effective was the advertising campaign launched by Hooters that of the dozens of editorials 
published immediately after the press release, only a few supported the EEOC's position.200  I 
have selected a short radio commentary by Laura Archer Pulfer both because it was broadcast 
nationally and because it involves some rhetoric that is substantially different from that appearing 
in the other pieces I have discussed.  
 
 The two major news programs on National Public Radio (NPR), Morning Edition and All Things 
Considered, have a practice of inviting short commentaries on current events by people who do 
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not normally appear on such broadcasts.  These commentaries usually do not present the party 
line of one of the familiar sides of an existing conflict, but add some new twist not previously 
seen in the straight news reporting.  Pulfer, a columnist for the Cincinnati Inquirer, read her 
Hooters commentary on Morning Edition on November 29, 1995, twelve days after Bovard's 
editorial was published.201  Her commentary is considerably shorter than Bovard's, only about 
350 words to his 1,000.  This is partially due to the medium in which she is working -- radio 
commentary necessarily must be shorter than newspaper editorials covering the same ground. 
 
 Here is the opening of Pulfer's commentary: 
 
  OK, so now the government is back to work.  There's a lot to do and nobody really wants 
them to use a bunch of their valuable time on a certain restaurant chain.  After all, the 
whole concept is all in fun.  First, and I know this is petty of me, but I'm not going to use 
the official name.  Here's a hint -- the company logo is an owl with  very large eyes.  
They're already getting millions of dollars of free publicity because four Chicago men 
have filed suit against them.  Let's just call this place Redneck Slang for Women's 
Breasts.202 
 
The most striking thing about this paragraph, and indeed, the whole commentary, is its tongue-in-
cheek informality.  In Bovard's editorial, informality was used as a specific device in specific 
places, while elsewhere the syntax was technical and sophisticated.  Here, the entire piece is 
written in a conversational, irreverent and amused voice.  The effect of the informality, as in 
Bovard's case, is to invoke the common people, but Pulfer's constant use of it is more successful 
in achieving that end.  Further, that voice emphasizes what is made clear at  the outset:  that this 
is Pulfer's opinion, pure and simple, and that she doesn't take her own opinion very seriously.  
We are not going to be treated to any revelations of new facts, nor is Pulfer claiming to have 
access to more or better information than we do, nor will there be a logical argument about the 
law or the facts.  On what basis, then, are we invited to be convinced? 
 
 The first sentence is a reference to the notorious shutdown, in November-December, 1995, of 
most of the federal government, occasioned by the temporary inability of the Congress and the 
President to agree on a budget.  Other commentators on the Hooters controversy alluded to the 
government shutdown, using the dispute to suggest ironically that the government should never 
have been allowed to reopen.203  In this commentary, however, Pulfer begins with the assertion 
that we do want the government to reopen, that its work is important, and that, in fact, we are all 
in general agreement that Hooters is not a worthy topic for its attention.  This stance is interesting 
because it is evident, from the tone of Pulfer's writing and the rest of what she says, that she 
thinks Hooters is in the wrong.  When she says, "the whole concept is all in fun", she leaves the 
referent unclear:  is she referring to Hooters's marketing strategy, the government shutdown, the 
idea that the government's time is valuable, or what? 
 
 She goes on to focus on something which she calls, and initially appears to be, petty:  whether to 
mention Hooters's name.  She gives us a "hint", suggesting that this is some sort of game -- and it 
really is a game, since it's obvious that anyone who will understand anything about her 
commentary will know who she's talking about from the very start.  Then she suggests that the 
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restaurant is receiving free publicity from the Latuga case, and she doesn't want to provide any 
more by naming it.  Suddenly the significance of the controversy is reversed -- the EEOC 
investigation isn't a threat to Hooters's life; it's the biggest boon the chain could have received.  
The dozens of editorials written about Hooters, we now realize, must have piqued the curiosity of 
thousands who would never have set foot in the place otherwise.  The thought abruptly crosses 
our minds that the entire controversy could be a publicity stunt. 
 
 In this amused, ironic, mocking and self-mocking observation, Pulfer shows us who she is and 
why we should believe in her.  Her ethos is based on the fact that she sees things differently from 
other people -- not because she's any smarter or better informed, but precisely because she's 
quirky.  By looking at things through a funhouse mirror, she is able to put together facts in new 
combinations that most people don't bother to see.  Consequently she is able to think creatively 
and arrive at new truths.  Such a claim is strong in our culture:  it is the claim of the shaman, the 
mystic, and the poet.  Such a voice is devoted to truth, but truth unsullied by formal logic, 
politeness or conventionality.  When she calls the place "Redneck Slang for Women's Breasts", 
she is being rude and insulting -- because she is speaking what she believes to be the truth 
without caring what anyone thinks. 
 
 Pulfer deliberately limits her audience.  By refusing to name Hooters, she necessarily is talking 
only to those who already know the facts of the dispute and the basic arguments on both sides.  
She is refusing to tell us these things, and giving us her own odd perspective instead.  As a result, 
we understand that this is a conversation for people who have already done their homework and 
are ready to hear a new and possibly bizarre outlook.  In academic terms, this is not an 
undergraduate survey course on the Hooters controversy, but a graduate seminar.  Obviously this 
elevates the status of the listener, who is assumed to be an active, and hopefully skeptical, 
participant in this process. 
 
 The second paragraph focusses on Hooters's advertising campaign: 
 
  The EEOC says the policy of hiring only women amounts to sex discrimination.  Now, 
here's what the company's doing.  They're handing out thousands of postcards with a guy 
with a mustache wearing skimpy shorts and a tank top, asking "What's wrong with this 
picture?"  I wonder why they picked this big, hairy man.  Was RuPaul on another gig?  
We're supposed to send these to our Congressperson asking Washington to "get a grip."  I 
think I'll send the card they gave me to Patricia Shroeder.  She seems very alert.  I'm sure 
she'll be able to figure out what is wrong with this picture.204 
 
Here, maintaining her strongly ironic and humorous tone, Pulfer's focus is entirely on the Hooters 
advertising campaign; again it is the publicity, rather than the substance of the dispute itself, that 
interests her.  She observes the EEOC position without commenting for or against it -- and 
rightly so, because in this text the outcome of the dispute is not important or relevant.  She then 
makes the same observation that I made earlier, namely that the type of model chosen for the 
advertising photograph bears some examination.205  By naming RuPaul, Pulfer reminds us of the 
broad variety of models for gender-bending roles and situations, implying that we should 
question why this particular picture should have been chosen -- although, again, only those who 
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already know who RuPaul is will get the joke.206  Similarly, Pulfer ridicules the instruction to 
lobby Congress by suggesting that Rep. Patricia Shroeder -- a prominent feminist legislator who 
has repeatedly challenged unequal treatment of the sexes -- would be an ideal person to read the 
advertisement. 
 
 Throughout this paragraph, Pulfer suggests arguments without making them, and, indeed, causes 
us to wonder exactly what argument she's making.  Hooters might have picked RuPaul instead of 
the model they did pick -- and therefore what?  Patricia Shroeder will be able to discern what is 
wrong with the picture -- and what will she conclude?  What, exactly is wrong with the picture 
anyway, and from what point of view?  In each case, Pulfer changes the perspective on the issue 
without following through with a conclusion; she leaves it to the listener to draw conclusions 
from the twist she has applied.  Were a first-year law student to talk this way, the professor might 
worry that the student was unable to take an argument through all of its necessary steps.  But law 
professors themselves do talk this way in class, precisely when they are trying to inspire students 
to make logical connections.  The students call it "hiding the ball" and find it enormously 
frustrating, but practitioners of the so-called "Socratic method" believe that it gives students the 
ability to think creatively on their feet.207  This is a deeply dialectical approach.  Not only does 
Pulfer permit us to think for ourselves, she insists on it, while at the same time pointing out the 
discontinuities that should inspire our ruminations. 
 
 The next paragraph moves in an utterly different direction: 
 
  Hamilton Jordan has been retained to make sure they get a fair shake.  That sounds about 
right.  Mr. Jordan has some practice in dealing with delicate matters of, shall we say, a 
mammary nature.  He was Jimmy Carter's chief of staff in 1978 when he denied a 
Washington Post report that he spit amaretto down the front of a woman's blouse.  The 
year before that, Mr. Jordan denied a report that he peeked down the blouse of the wife of 
the Egyptian ambassador.208 
 
What is this passage doing here?  It appears to be an ad hominem attack on Hooters's particular 
choice of associates,209 and a very strange sort of attack at that.  Hamilton Jordan, who Pulfer 
says has been "retained" by Hooters, is known for many things, including his successful battle 
with cancer, his unsuccessful campaign for the United States Senate, his chairmanship of the 
Association of Tennis Professionals and his work for third-party presidential candidate Ross 
Perot.210  It seems odd to focus on two disputed accusations occurring at least seventeen years in 
the past; even if these accusations against Jordan were justified, what possible connection do they 
have to the case at hand?  By noting not that they happened, but merely that Jordan denied them, 
Pulfer lets us know just how uncertain all of this is.  What function does this conspicuous non 
sequitur serve, other than as a sort of "cheap shot?" 
 
 The only link seems to be a metaphorical one:  the centrality of female breasts as an object of 
staring or other activities in American culture generally.  Just as the restaurant is named for a 
"Slang for Women's Breasts", just as looking at breasts appears to be the primary entertainment 
provided by Hooters, so did was this prominent, important man apparently engaged in rude and 
offensive actions involving women's breasts.  The topic is not sex discrimination against men, 
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nor sexual harassment per se, but a cultural obsession with the female anatomy.  That is the 
issue, and that is what we should be talking about.  What bothers Pulfer, as implied by the earlier 
paragraphs, is that the Latuga case, the EEOC investigation, and the ad campaign only serve to 
pique the public's curiosity about Hooters and perpetuate this very cultural obsession.  By 
constructing her voice in the way she has done, Pulfer tells us not that these things are true, but 
that we should seriously consider thinking the way she does and wondering whether they are true. 
 
 Her final paragraph attacks the discrimination question directly -- or almost directly: 
 
  The official company line is that if they have to hire men, it will put them out of business.  
That sounds just like what women were being told 30 years ago when they wanted to be 
stockbrokers and lawyers and bankers.  These places have a purpose.  They're places for 
people to eat who don't care much about food and who really don't care very much about 
women, except, of course, for their breasts.  As for the rest of us, if we don't stay away in 
droves, then the joke's on us.211 
 
Again, Pulfer changes the perspective of an argument.  Hooters's BFOQ argument is not the same 
as arguments made against bringing women into lucrative and powerful professions -- except that 
it is.  The old bankers and lawyers weren't talking about the employee's ability to do the job -- or 
were they?  Hooters isn't trying to maintain gender-specific hiring because of outdated prejudices 
in the profession or its clientele -- or is it?  Could it be that all of these arguments are about the 
same thing -- the oppression and exploitation of women?  Pulfer steps back from the 
technicalities of the question and focusses, again, on the broad cultural implications, not by 
making the connections directly nor putting together a logical argument, but by forcing us to 
frame and defend a denial of her beliefs. 
 
 By talking about the "purpose" of Hooters, Pulfer would seem to be admitting the strength of the 
BFOQ argument:  Hooters has a purpose, and that purpose is sexual -- that is, breasts.  But to 
Pulfer this does not work in Hooters's favor; instead, it raises the broader cultural question of 
what a BFOQ should be, and what it really means when we say that sex is really a qualification 
of a job.  Does this mean she's challenging the statute, our interpretations of it, or something 
else?  Again, to Pulfer, this doesn't matter -- no matter how we frame the argument, a business 
based on breasts is a bad idea.  Her advice is that we refuse to patronize it, lest we be duped by 
the very publicity associated with the dispute -- indeed, she implies that we betray our own 
abilities if we fail to stay away. 
 
 In the world created by this text, Pulfer is an idiosyncratic teacher who teaches by suggesting 
difficult contradictions and weird perspectives, and asks her students to reason their way out of 
them.  The reader is seen as knowledgeable, intelligent and responsible for making both policy 
analysis and real-world decisions.  Hooters is seen as conniving and manipulative, while the 
EEOC seems thick and possibly irrelevant. 
 
 The problem with this highly dynamic, indirect rhetoric is that it makes it too easy simply write 
Hooters's genuine concerns right out of the argument.  Isn't there something real involved in this 
dispute?  And if EEOC's position were enforced, isn't there some evidence suggesting that 
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Hooters's business would be damaged?  Is she saying that this business deserves to be damaged, 
and that the same is true of all similar businesses?  Because of her style of argument Pulfer does 
not have to address these questions directly, if at all.  Because she refuses to deal in 
technicalities, she leaves the most difficult legal questions unanswered and possibly 
unanswerable.  This method of talking is a fine way to begin a conversation, but it seems a poor 
way to end one. 
 
 
VIII.  Some Conclusions. 
 
 With such wildly contrasting universes created by the rhetoric of these texts, I am left wondering 
whether those universes and their implications are inevitably dictated by the parties' substantive 
positions, or whether they could have adopted each others' positions while retaining their 
constitutive rhetoric.  Clearly I approve of the rhetoric used by EEOC, and disapprove of the 
rhetoric used by Hooters press release; I go so far as to call them "honest" and "dishonest", 
respectively.  I find EEOC's rhetoric to invite the growth and critical capacities of its readers, 
while the Hooters rhetoric, both in its press kit and its advertisement, seems to invite naught but 
unquestioning belief -- and this while pretending to fight for the little guy against a giant.  As I 
suggested before, I have been inclined to think that "good rhetoric" can appear even in a "bad" 
substantive text, and vice versa.  These documents do not modify that view; indeed, EEOC gives 
very little indication of its substantive position at all, and it is very easy to imagine that Hooters 
could, with its substantive views, adopt a very different rhetorical stance. 
 
 The Casey and Becker essays raise another, but equally disturbing reflection:  Gender is either 
everything, or it is nothing.  In Becker's language the concept of sexual difference, the use of 
sexuality to degrade, and the societal oppression of women loom so large that the plaintiff and 
the defendant and all of their mundane concerns seem to evaporate.  In Casey's language, gender 
oppression and the concept of exploitation never arises at all.  Casey, too, ignores the male 
plaintiffs, but the only mention of any sort of actual problems created by gender are in her ironic 
reference to Lillie Rubin.  What she cares about is freedom and good decision making and, above 
all, winning. 
 
 The Bovard editorial and the Pulfer commentary present two radically different forms of rhetoric.  
Bovard reports facts, while Pulfer assumes that facts are known; Bovard provides no opportunity 
for the reader to form her own opinion, while Pulfer insists that the reader form an opinion with 
little or no help from Pulfer; Bovard is in a war against the intellectual elite, while Pulfer seems 
to be critiquing our culture as a whole.  The two pieces to share a common rhetorical thread, 
though:  Neither of them bears a close resemblance to legal rhetoric or legal writing.  The law is 
not important, nor even a rigorous analysis of the facts; these two writers seem much freer to ride 
the tides of emotion, outrage, quirkiness or humor than, for example, either Casey or Becker.  
Yet something is lost, here -- neither Bovard nor Pulfer ever reaches the core difficulties of the 
substantive issues, nor the hard questions of precedent or statutory interpretation.  Their words 
can be very satisfying, but in another sense, empty. 
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 While the texts I have gathered in this article vary considerably in their form, tone and content, 
they share some commonalities that shed light on the kind of dialogue being created by the 
chorus of voices speaking about the Hooters controversies.  Of the seven different texts sampled, 
four support Hooters's position while three support the EEOC's.  The four texts supporting 
Hooters share a strong, common thread:  a perceived gap between EEOC officials, academics and 
feminists on the one hand, and ordinary people and Hooters on the other hand.  In all four of 
those texts, the notion that Hooters's hiring practices violate Title VII is imagined to be 
something of which only a mind divorced from everyday reality could conceive.  Those who can 
conceive of it are defined to be outside the realm of normal people that always includes both the 
writer and the reader.  The texts assume that common sense, routine experience and an 
understanding of the way business and sexuality operate would naturally form an opinion that 
would place Hooters's marketing strategy and hiring practices outside the realm of what can 
reasonably be regulated.  Anyone who believes otherwise is, well, crazy. 
 
 But remember that the Hooters controversies are the surface of a deeper, more troubling issue:  
the extent to which sexuality is an appropriate commodity for trade.  Numerous commentators 
have criticized the commodification of women's bodies, suggesting both that it fosters the 
continuation of a cultural practice of treating women as objects or instruments to be used for the 
benefit of men, and that it has the practical effect of encouraging increased sexual abuse or 
violence.212  Some of these have named Hooters itself as an important contributor to a culture of 
sexual violence.213  Among the writers I have discussed, only Becker and Pulfer come close to 
attacking this cultural issue at all, and in each case one wants to hear more of it.  Most of the 
other writers seem to assume, indeed, that the cultural question isn't really a valid one.  Elements 
of the Hooters press kit, as well as some of Hooters's other public statements, speak repeatedly of 
"wholesome, all-American sex-appeal" as if to be worried about the objectification and 
domination of women is un-American.214 
 
 When stepping back and looking not only at the rhetoric of these texts, but the rhetoric of this 
article, one is moved to ask the extent to which my own prejudices have influenced my view of 
the rhetoric.  I presented those prejudices early on, in order to attempt to prevent such pollution.  
Yet it is clear that I have tended to see value in the rhetoric of those who oppose Hooters in one 
way or another, while seeing dishonesty and manipulation in those who support it.  Of course this 
is not uniformly true, and I have found both praiseworthy and troubling rhetoric in almost every 
piece I have examined.  Yet still, since I am praising those whose substantive views I endorse, 
you may wonder whether I would have said the same things if identical rhetoric had been used to 
make contrary arguments.  I don't know.  I hope so.  It seems to me that someone like Pulfer 
might have easily engaged in the same sort of "bad" rhetoric I see in the Hooters advertisement; I 
am even more strongly convinced that a pro-Hooters case could be made with what I would call 
good rhetoric. 
 
 Of course, the term "prejudice" here is broader than strong views on mere substantive issues.  I 
am a lawyer, and an academic lawyer at that; I have a certain training and a certain background, 
and I have come to appreciate certain kinds of language -- specifically that which raises an 
awareness of complexity.  Someone with my background and in my profession tends to deplore 
language that erases complexity and causes us to think that all things are straightforward; for 
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example, there is very little advertising of which I approve.  These prejudices are systemic, and 
are present not only throughout this article but in all of my published writing.  Perhaps they are 
simply my views of what rhetoric should be. 
 
 When we argue about an issue so vexed as the proper place of gender and sexuality within the 
commerce and politics of a society, we inevitably face both deeply entrenched beliefs and nearly 
intractable subtleties.  To acknowledge complexity and encourage critical, independent analysis 
seems essential if we are to escape the platitudes, fanaticism, and unconsidered opinions and 
practices that gave rise to the dispute in the first place.  We rely on easy metaphors and common 
sense to our peril. 
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for example) than would be required of her if she were of the other sex.  This would apply to 
quid pro quo harassment of male employees as well as female, and may hold true even if the 
harassing individual were of the same sex as the harassed employee.  Christopher W. Deering, 
Comment, Same-Gender Sexual Harassment: A Need to Re-Examine the Legal Underpinnings of 
Title VII's Ban on Discrimination "Because of" Sex, 27 CUMB. L. REV. 231 (1996); Kara L. 
Gross, Note, Toward Gender Equality and Understanding: Recognizing that Same-Sex Sexual 
Harassment is Sex Discrimination, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1165 (1996); Trish K. Murphy, Note & 
Comment, Without Distinction: Recognizing Coverage of Same-Gender Sexual Harassment 
Under Title VII, 70 WASH. L. REV. 1125 (1995); Regina L. Stone-Harris, Comment, Same-Sex 
Harassment -- the Next Step in the Evolution of Sexual Harassment Law Under Title VII, 28 ST. 
MARY'S L.J. 269 (1996). 
1515Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65; 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (1996).  Drucilla Cornell, the noted post-
structuralist feminist legal scholar, has suggested an alternative definition of sexual harassment: 
16 
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17 My definition of sexual harassment reads as follows: sexual harassment consists of a) 
unilaterally imposed sexual requirements in the context of unequal power, or b) the creation and 
perpetuation of a work environment which enforces sexual shame by reducing individuals to 
projected stereotypes or objectified fantasies of their "sex" so as to undermine the primary good 
of their self-respect, or c) employment-related retaliation against a subordinate employee or, in 
the case of a university, a student, for a consensually mutually desired sexual relationship. (170) 
18 
19DRUCILLA CORNELL, THE IMAGINARY DOMAIN: ABORTION, PORNOGRAPHY & SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT 170 (1995). 
2016Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993). 
2117Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 880 (9th Cir. 1991).  For a lengthy recitation of different 
court pronouncements on this standard, see Torres v. Piani, __ F.3d __, 1997 WL 290196, *13 
n.6 (2d Cir. 1997).  This particular term may be misleading, though, since in principle it is 
possible for a male to be the victim of sexual harassment.  Nevertheless I applaud the term, 
because it represents an ironic reversal of the traditional "reasonable man" standard, which has 
sometimes been thought to exclude women from the category of reasonable persons.  See Naomi 
R. Cahn, The Looseness of Legal Language: the Reasonable Woman Standard in Theory and 
Practice, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1398 (1992); Caroline Forell, Essentialism, Empathy, and the 
Reasonable Woman, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 769 (1994). 
221829 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) (1996) 
2319§ 1604.11(d)-(e). 
2420§ 1604.11(e). 
252142 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(e) (West 1994). 
2622See, e.g., Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hospital, 78 F.3d 128, 134 (3d Cir. 1996), and 
cases cited. 
272329 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(2) (1994). 
2824§ 1604.2(a)(1). 
2925§ 1604.2(a)(1)(iii). 
3026UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 206 (1991). 
3127Id.  For a detailed discussion of Johnson Controls, including an analysis of its constitutive 
rhetoric, see Kenneth L. Schneyer, Talking About Judges, Talking About Women:  Constitutive 
Rhetoric in the Johnson Controls Case, 31 AM. BUS. L.J. 117 (1993). 
3228See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 335 (1977). 
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3329See St. Cross v. Playboy Club, Appeal No. 773, Case No. CFS 22618-70 (N.Y. Human 
Rights App. Bd., 1971); Weber v. Playboy Club, Appeal No. 774, Case No. CFS 22619-70 (N.Y. 
Human Rights. App. Bd., 1971). 
3430See, e.g., Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 301 (N.D. Tex. 1981). 
3531Guardian Capital Corp. v. N.Y. State Div. of Human Rights, 46 A.D.2d 832, 833 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1974), appeal dismissed, 36 N.Y.2d 806 (1975).  One concurring justice questioned whether 
such a decision might be inconsistent with the dicta in the Playboy cases.  46 A.D.2d at 833-34 
(Reynolds, J. concurring).  It should be noted that the Guardian Capital case apparently involved 
New York State law rather than Title VII.  46 A.D.2d at 832.  
3632517 F.Supp. 292. 
3733Id. at 294-95.  It should be noted, though, that the court in Wilson seriously doubted that the 
sex appeal was actually necessary for the success of Southwest's particular business.  Id. at 295-
96. 
3834Id. at 301.  This is the passage in which the court cites the dicta in the two Playboy appeals. 
Id. 
3935Id. at 302. 
4036Id. at 303-04. 
4137Kelly Ann Cahill, Note, Hooters:  Should There Be an Assumption of Risk Defense to Some 
Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment Claims?, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1107, 1144-53 
(1995). 
4238Id. 
4339I am indebted to Mary Becker for this observation. 
4440Similarly, the Supreme Court has rejected the equivalent of a "cause in fact" argument in an 
age discrimination case.  McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 513 U.S. 352, 359-60 
(1995).  Cahill is aware of this line of reasoning, and makes a policy argument favoring an 
assumption of risk defense on the grounds that it would result in "the recognition of the capacity 
of women to make voluntary choices about where they work and to take responsibility for these 
choices."  Cahill, supra note , at 1145.  Jeannie Sclafani Rhee, in her more recent article 
discussing sexual harassment at Hooters, considers Cahill's line of reasoning and rejects it.  Rhee, 
supra note , at 190-94.  Rhee's rejection of the assumption of risk defense, however, is based not 
on the comparison between tort law and discrimination law, but on the assertion that the sale of 
sexual appeal is not, or should not be, congruent with the sale of sexual harassment: 
45 
46  The potential availability of an assumption of risk defense for sexual harassment compels 
women who commodify their sexuality essentially to consent to their harassment and abuse.  The 
notion that women have the right to assert their sexuality in the public domain but must suffer all 
the harmful social consequences is equivalent to a denial of that right. 
47 
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48Id. at 194. 
4941See JAMES BOYD WHITE, HERACLES' BOW: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE 
LAW, x-xii (1985); compare Paul J. Heald, Economics as One of the Humanities: An Ecumenical 
Response to Weisberg, West and White, 4 S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J. 293 (1995). 
5042James Boyd White, Law and Literature: "No Manifesto", 39 MERCER L. REV. 739 (1988).  
An interesting and different layout of this movement may be found in Robin L. West, The 
Literary Lawyer, 27 PAC. L.J. 1187 (1996). 
5143See, e.g., John Denvir, "Deep Dialogue" -- James Joyce's Contribution to American 
Constitutional Theory, 3 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LITERATURE 1 (1991); Carolyn Heilbrun & Judith 
Resnik, Convergences: Law, Literature and Feminism, 99 YALE L.J. 1913, 1936 (1990); Dmitry 
N. Feovanov, Luna Law: The Libertarian Vision in Heinlein's The Moon is a Harsh Mistress, 63 
TENN. L. REV. 71 (1995); Norman J. Finkel, Achilles Fuming, Odysseus Stewing, and Hamlet 
Brooding: On the Story of the Murder/Manslaughter Distinction, 74 NEB. L. REV. 742 (1995); 
Linda R. Hirshman, Brontë, Bloom and Bork:  An Essay on the Moral Education of Judges, 137 
U. PA. L. REV. 177 (1988); Vanessa Laird, Dueling Narratives in An American Tragedy and the 
Criminal Law, 59 TENN. L. REV. 131 (1991); David Luban, Some Greek Trials: Order and 
Justice in Homer, Hesiod, Aeschylus and Plato, 54 Tenn. L. Rev. 279 (1987); Amy R. Mashburn 
& Dabney D. Ware, The Burden of Truth: Reconciling Literary Reality with Professional 
Mythology, 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 1257 (1996); Martha Minow, Stripped Down Like a Runner or 
Enriched by Experience:  Bias and Impartiality of Judges and Jurors, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1201, 1214-18 (1992); Martha Minow, Identities, 3 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 97 (1991); Martha 
Minow, Words and the Door to the Land of Change:  Law, Language and Family Violence, 43 
VAND. L. REV. 1665, 1687-88 (1990); Amy D. Ronner, Amathia and Denial of "In the Home" in 
Bowers v. Hardwick and Shahar v. Bowers: Objective Correlatives and the Bacchae as Tools for 
Analyzing Privacy and Intimacy, 44 U. KAN. L. REV. 263 (1994); Elizabeth Tobin, Imagining the 
Mother's Text:  Toni Morrison's Beloved and Contemporary Law, 16 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 233 
(1993); Robin West, Economic Man and Literary Woman:  One Contrast, 39 MERCER L. REV. 
867 (1988); Robin West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice:  The Role of Consent in the Moral 
and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 384 (1985). 
5244See, e.g., STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY (1989); INTERPRETING LAW AND 
LITERATURE: A HERMENEUTIC READER (Sanford Levinson & Steven Mailloux, eds., 1988); Betsy 
B. Baker, Constructing Justice:  Theories of the Subject in Law and Literature, 75 MINN. L. REV. 
581 (1991); Kenji Yoshino, Note, What's Past is Prologue: Precedent in Literature and Law, 104 
YALE L.J. 471 (1994). 
5345See, e.g., BROOK THOMAS, CROSS-EXAMINATIONS OF LAW AND LITERATURE (1987); 
RICHARD WEISBERG, POETHICS:  AND OTHER STRATEGIES OF LAW AND LITERATURE 51-92 
(1992); Alan D. Boyer, Formalism, Realism and Naturalism:  Cross-Currents in American 
Letters and Law, 23 CONN. L. REV. 669 (1991); Michael H. Hoffheimer, Artistic Convention and 
Natural Law:  Didactic Treatment of Justice and Authority in the Works of Fielding, Hawthorne, 
and Fritz Lang, 63 TEMP. L. REV. 483 (1990); Nancy E. Johnson, Women, Agency, and the Law: 
Mediations of the Novel in the Late Eighteenth Century, 19 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 269 (1996); 
Penelope Pether, Jangling the Keys to the Kingdom: Some Reflections on The Crucible, on an 
American Constitutional Paradox, and on Australian Judicial Review, 8 CARDOZO STUD. L. & 
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LITERATURE 317 (1996); Paul Joseph & Sharon Carton, The Law of the Federation:  Images of 
Law, Lawyers and the Legal System in "Star Trek:  The Next Generation", 24 U. TOL. L. REV. 43 
(1992); Larry Wertheim, Law as Frolic: Law and Literature in A Frolic of His Own, 21 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 421 (1995) (reviewing WILLIAM GADDIS, A FROLIC OF HIS OWN (1994)).  You 
have probably observed that these four are not mutually exclusive.  For example, a work of 
literature like The Merchant of Venice might be examined both for the popular perception of the 
legal system contained in it and for its prescriptions about humanity from which the legal system 
could afford to learn.  For a sampling of different commentaries on The Merchant of Venice in 
legal scholarship, see Kenji Yoshino, The Lawyer of Belmont, 9 YALE J.L. & HUM. 183 (1997). 
5446See DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL:  THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM 
(1992);  DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED:  THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 
(1987); Sally Frank, Eve Was Right to Eat the "Apple": The Importance of Narrative in the Art of 
Lawyering, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 79 (1996); Derrick Bell, The Final Report: Harvard's 
Affirmative Action Policy, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2382 (1989); Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to 
Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989); Richard K. 
Sherwin, Law Frames: Historical Truth and Narrative Necessity in a Criminal Case, 47 STAN. L. 
REV. 39 (1994). 
5547This term was coined by James Boyd White, who regularly uses it in his scholarship.  
White's own work is probably the best exposition of the analysis of constitutive rhetoric.  See 
JAMES BOYD WHITE, ACTS OF HOPE:  CREATING AUTHORITY IN LAW, LITERATURE AND POLITICS 
(1994) [hereinafter WHITE, ACTS OF HOPE]; JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION:  AN 
ESSAY IN CULTURAL AND LEGAL CRITICISM (1990); WHITE, supra note ; JAMES BOYD WHITE, 
WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING:  CONSTITUTIONS AND RECONSTITUTIONS OF LANGUAGE, 
CHARACTER AND COMMUNITY (1984) [hereinafter WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE]; JAMES BOYD 
WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION (1973); James Boyd White, What Can a Lawyer Learn from 
Literature?, 102 HARV. L. REV. 2014 (1989) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND 
LITERATURE:  A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION (1988).  My own work has been mostly based on 
constitutive rhetoric.  See Kenneth L. Schneyer, The Culture of Risk:  Deconstructing Mutual 
Mistake, 34 AM. BUS. L.J. 429 (1997); Kenneth L. Schneyer, Avoiding the Personal Pronoun:  
The Rhetoric of Display and Camouflage in the Law of Sexual Orientation, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 
1313 (1994) [hereinafter Schneyer, Avoiding the Personal Pronoun]; Schneyer, supra note .  
5648At this point it is inevitable that you will begin to engage in precisely that sort of assessment 
of your relationship with me.  That we have a relationship, and that I play a large part in shaping 
it, is one of the theses of this article; that you should critically appraise that relationship is one of 
the things that I am arguing is desirable. 
5749See generally WHITE, supra note , at 3-26, 192-93; see also IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING 
FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 35-44 (James W. Ellington, trans., 2d Ed. 1983) (1785). 
5850Bill McDowell & Charles Bernstein, Big Guns: 1995's Hottest Growth Companies, 
RESTAURANTS & INSTITUTIONS, Aug. 1, 1995, at 56, 56.  See also Jack Hayes, Hooters Clones 
Scramble for Share of Florida Market, NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, Jan. 13, 1992, at 1. 
5951McDowell & Bernstein, supra note . 
6052Id.; Rhee, supra note , at 163-64 & n.4. 
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6153Robyn Blumner, Hooters Has a Right to Sell Sex, ARIZ. REPUBLIC / PHOENIX GAZETTE, Dec. 
5, 1995, at B7; Carrie Stetler, Where Skimpy Clothes Arrive with the Order, 1995 WL 1182540, 
Dec. 4, 1995, at *2 (originally published in the STAR-LEDGER (Newark, NJ)).   In a conversation, 
however, one server told me that the restaurant would not tolerate having patrons attempt to 
touch the servers. 
6254Blumner, supra note , at B7; Stetler, supra note , at *5-6.   In various articles criticizing or 
supporting the restaurant, there have been assertions that servers at Hooters are generally large-
breasted; indeed, the word "hooters" is supposed to be a slang term for breasts.  Stetler, supra 
note , at *5.  While writing the first draft of this article I visited the only Hooters restaurant in 
Rhode Island.  If I had to characterize the servers' physiques, I would say that they were 
extremely thin.  I did observe, however, that all the servers I saw were white, and most were 
blonde.  Although my observations do not necessarily describe Hooters restaurants in general, it 
does seem fair to comment that the appearance of the "girl next door" rather depends on where 
you live. 
6355Deborah L. Rhode, P.C. or Discrimination?, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 22, 1996, at A19, A19.; Mike 
Rosen, The Feds Would Do Well to Spend a Little Time Tending Bar Themselves, COLO. SPRINGS 
GAZETTE TELEGRAPH, Jun. 1, 1996, at B11, B11; Estela Villanueva, Council Delays Action on 
"Hooters" Restaurant, DES MOINES REG., Nov. 9, 1993, at 1, 1. 
6456James E. Causey, Giving a Hoot: Chain Takes on the EEOC, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Nov. 
16, 1995, at 1, 1; Mark Patinkin, Sometimes Raising a "Hue" 'n "Cry" Doesn't Make Sense, 
HOUS. CHRON., Dec. 5, 1995, at 2, 2; Rhode, supra note , at A19; Stetler, supra note , at *5. 
6557See, e.g., Dwayne Atwood, Ruling Limits Hooters, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Dec. 12, 
1995, at D1, D1 ("Owners and promoters have billed Hooters as a family restaurant"); Denise 
Cardinal, Hooters Girls on Endangered Species List, BUS. REC., Dec. 11, 1995, at 19; Joel Kurth, 
Liquor Board Doesn't Give on Hooters, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, May 14, 1997, at D4, D4 
("Restaurant officials [say] that they operate a 'family establishment'"); E. J. Montini, In Defense 
of 2-Edged Monikers, ARIZ. REPUBLIC/PHOENIX GAZETTE, Feb. 17, 1995, at B1, B1 (regional 
director says Hooters is a family restaurant); Holly Selby, NOW Has Bone to Pick with Hooters 
at Harborplace, BALT. SUN, Nov. 3, 1990, at 1A; Villanueva, supra note , at 1 ("Larry 
Klinghoffer, owner of the Omaha and possibly the Des Moines Hooters, touted the eatery as a 
casual, family restaurant with a Florida beach theme"); Jim Wieker, Beer-less Hooters Starts 
Tapping Market, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Apr. 22, 1997, at A12, A12 ("Hooters managers argue 
that it's a family restaurant that doesn't have to sell liquor to stay in business"); Teresa Wiltz, 
Many Give a Hoot About Mt. Prospect Eatery, CHI. TRIB., July 6, 1992, at 1, 1 ("At a recent 
Village Board meeting, Hooters representatives described the restaurant as a 'family-style' 
operation that would not have a bar and would serve beer and wine only with meals"). 
6658Rhee, supra note , at 164-65. 
6759See, e.g., Kevin Murphy, Hooters Case Goes to Trial, WIS. ST. J., Feb. 5, 1997, at 3A, 3A. 
6860See Rhee, supra note , at 165.  The recent, still-pending case was filed in the U. S. District 
Court in Madison, Wisconsin.  Murphy, supra note . 
6961See supra notes  to  and accompanying text. 
7062Latuga v. Hooters, Inc., No. 93-C-7709 (N. D. Ill. filed Dec. 23, 1993).  In October, 1994, 
John Ginter and Patrick Salisbury filed a similar complaint.  Ginter v. Hooters, Inc., No. 94-C-
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6338 (N. D. Ill filed Oct. 20, 1994).  In December, 1994, an amended, consolidated class action 
complaint was filed combining both cases.  Amended Consolidated Action Complaint, Dec. 16, 
1994, Latuga v. Hooters, Inc [hereinafter Class Action Complaint].  In April of 1995, the court 
ordered the consolidation of the cases.  Minute Order, Apr. 6, 1995, Latuga v. Hooters, Inc. 
7163Class Action Complaint, supra note .  There have been repeated procedural maneuvers 
concerning the certification of the class and the propriety of naming the national chain as a 
defendant. 
7264Amended Answer to Consolidated Class Action Complaint, Dec. 5, 1995, Latuga v. Hooters, 
at 39. 
7365While Hooters has overtly and enthusiastically publicized certain aspects of the EEOC 
investigation, such as the length of the agency's 1995 settlement offer and some of the demands 
contained in it, see Hooters Says No to EEOC Demand It Hire Hooters Guys 2 (Nov. 15, 1995) 
(press release, on file with author) [hereinafter Hooters Press Release], neither the EEOC nor 
Hooters has been willing to publish the full text of any document between them nor the details of 
the investigation process.  Aware that the EEOC had already stated that it could not make any 
comments concerning the pending investigation, I contacted Hooters's attorneys to request a copy 
of the settlement offer.  The request was declined. 
7466See id. 
7567See supra note ; infra notes -. 
7668See, e.g., USA TODAY, Nov. 15, 1995, at 9C. 
7769Rosen, supra note , at B11; Hostettler Condemns Demands on Hooters, COURIER-J. 
(Louisville, Ky.), Dec. 24, 1995, at 2B. 
7870Chuck Hutchcraft, Hooters Case Won't Get a Second Look, CHI. TRIB., May 2, 1996, at § 3, 
1.  At the time of my conversations with Hooters's attorneys in May of 1996, the EEOC had not 
made any official representation to Hooters that the investigation would be dropped or that it 
would decline to sue.  (This was the reason for their understandable reluctance to release 
documents which might be relevant in a lawsuit that could still occur.)  The letter from Casellas 
to Representative Fawell seems to be the only indication that this is the EEOC's intention. 
7971Jeannie Sclafani Rhee writes that "[a]t its core, the debate over the liability of Hooters 
restaurants for third-party harassment of its female employees can be viewed as a proxy for the 
debate over the ethics of the commodification of women's sexuality."  Rhee, supra note , at 180. 
8072In at least one of the harassment suits, such was emphatically not the position of the 
plaintiffs, who discharged their attorneys for making that claim at all.  Id. at 186. 
8173I am disregarding, here, the morass of local ordinances involving strip clubs, pornographic 
movie houses and adult bookstores, as well as the complex First Amendment implications 
thereof.  See generally Alfred C. Yen, Judicial Review of the Zoning of Adult Entertainment: A 
Search for the Purposeful Suppression of Protected Speech, 12 PEPP. L. REV. 651 (1985). 
8274See generally Catherine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE 
L.J. 1281 (1991). 
8375Sociologist Edwin M. Schur discusses the fact that males are predominantly buyers, and 
females predominantly sellers, in the sex industry, in EDWIN M. SCHUR, THE AMERICANIZATION 
OF SEX 84-85, 89 (1988). 
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8476Rhee, supra note , at 185.  For a work by a non-lawyer making essentially this same charge 
against Hooters and similar businesses, see Sarah Ciriello, Commodification of Women: 
Morning, Noon, and Night, in TRANSFORMING A RAPE CULTURE 265 (Emilie Buchwald, Pamela 
R. Fletcher, and Martha Roth, eds., 1993). 
8577Rhee, supra note , at 185-90. 
8678Id. at 189. 
8779The difficulty, for me, in this line of reasoning is that it operates on the assumption that the 
servers -- the "Hooters girls" themselves -- are empowered and enriched by this form of 
commodification.  Rhee is aware that many women working in the sex industry "are commonly . 
. . the most marginalized and disempowered of the community such that their 'choice' to 
commodify is in essence a false choice".  Id. at 187.  She points out, however, that the same 
cannot be said for highly-paid women who display their sexuality, such as film stars and models.  
Id.  Certainly there are those workers in the sex industry -- as in any industry -- whose services 
are so in demand that they themselves become powerful forces within it.  But such an 
observation cannot be useful in assessing the lot of the average worker in that industry, any more 
than one can judge the lot of most actors by examining the life of Harrison Ford.  But in the sex 
industry in general and at Hooters in particular, the persons profiting from the display of 
sexuality are almost all men.  See SCHUR, supra note , at 80-92; Ciriello, supra note .  If a 
Hooters restaurant existed at which the servers themselves were the owners and therefore 
profited directly from the commodification of their sexuality, then it would be much easier to 
accept Rhee's line of reasoning.  In such a case, of course, lawsuits for sex discrimination of any 
kind would be impossible because the servers would not be "employees" within the meaning of 
the statute. 
8880The very notion of what should be presented to a "family" is controversial.  I was surprised, 
for example, to learn from the producer of a popular television series that "this is a family show, 
and we've learned that families like a lot of violence." 
8981Schneyer, Avoiding the Personal Pronoun, supra note , at 1342. 
9082I am reminded of the plea of a defense attorney in a famous mystery novel: 
91 
92  "On my client's behalf -- on Miss Vane's behalf, my lord, I beg your lordship's indulgence 
for a few words.  A charge has been brought against her, my lord, the very awful charge of 
murder, and I should like it to be made clear, my lord, that my client leaves this court without a 
stain upon her character.  As I am informed, my lord, this is not a case of the charge being 
withdrawn in default of evidence.  I understand, my lord, that further information has come to the 
police which definitely proves the entire innocence of my client.  I also understand, my lord, that 
a further arrest has been made and that an inquiry will follow, my lord, in due course.  My lord, 
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this lady must go forth into the world acquitted, not only at this bar, but at the bar of public 
opinion.  Any ambiguity would be intolerable, . . ." 
93 
94DOROTHY L. SAYERS, STRONG POISON 225-26 (Perennial Library 1987) (1930).  Despite the 
wholehearted support of the prosecutor and the judge in this effort, it appears in later novels that 
the accused has been anything but acquitted "at the bar of public opinion."  See DOROTHY L. 
SAYERS, HAVE HIS CARCASE (1932); DOROTHY L. SAYERS, GAUDY NIGHT (1936). 
9583For detailed examinations of the constitutive rhetoric of some political speeches, see WHITE, 
ACTS OF HOPE, supra note , at 275-302; see also Dan F. Hahn, Ask Not What a Youngster Can 
Do For You:  Kennedy's Inaugural Address, 12 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 610 (1982); Schneyer, 
Avoiding the Personal Pronoun, supra note , at 1339-40. 
9684Hooters Press Release, supra note . 
9785Questions and Answers About BFOQs and the EEOC (November 15, 1995) (part of 
unpublished press kit, on file with author) [hereinafter Q&A]. 
9886Backgrounder: EEOC Complaint Against Hooters (November 15, 1995) (part of unpublished 
press kit, on file with author) [hereinafter Backgrounder]. 
9987The Hooters Companies: Fact Sheet (November 15, 1995) (part of unpublished press kit, on 
file with author) [hereinafter Fact Sheet]. 
10088Statement by Mike McNeil (Nov. 15, 1995) (part of unpublished press kit, on file with 
author) [hereinafter McNeil Statement]. 
10189Statement of Cheryl Whiting, Press Conference (Nov. 15, 1995) (part of unpublished press 
kit, on file with author) [hereinafter Whiting Statement]. 
10290Statement of Meghan O'Malley-Barnard, Press Conference (Nov. 15, 1995) (part of 
unpublished press kit, on file with author) [hereinafter O'Malley-Barnard Statement]. 
10391Biographies (Nov. 15, 1995) (part of unpublished press kit, on file with author) [hereinafter 
Biographies]. 
10492Gerald D. Skoning, Employment Law's "Top Ten" List for '94, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 9, 1995, at 
A21. 
10593Gerald D. Skoning, Employment Law's Ten Best of '93, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 31, 1994, at 15. 
10694McDowell & Bernstein, supra note . 
10795Hooters of America Charitable Giving (Nov. 15, 1995) (part of unpublished press kit, on 
file with author) [hereinafter Giving]. 
10896Hooters Locations (Nov. 15, 1995) (part of unpublished press kit, on file with author) 
[hereinafter Locations]. 
10997Hooters Press Release, supra note , at 1. 
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11098Id. 
11199Of course, critical theory in general and feminist theory in particular have long recognized 
that claims of objectivity are frequently tools for the dominant class to legitimate its own 
perspective as the "real" one.  This claim of objectivity, therefore, might be seen as an inherently 
patriarchal device.  See generally CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: 
DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW (1987); PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND 
RIGHTS (1991); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. 
L. REV. 1685, 1742-45 (1976); Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence, 95 
YALE L.J. 1373, 1376-80 (1986). 
112100As will be seen below, the EEOC press release responding to Hooters entirely avoids any 
pretense of reportorial style, but is a frank expression of opinion.  In this sense it must be 
considered more honest, although it has problems of its own. 
113101As will be seen infra, Hooters published an advertisement in which exactly that image 
appeared. 
1141021 Samuel 17. 
115103See Hooters Press Release, supra note , at 2; Q&A, supra note , at 1; Backgrounder, supra 
note , at 1; McNeil Statement, supra note , at 3; Whiting Statement, supra note , at 2. 
116104Biographies, supra note , at 1.  Since Whiting's biography was released in 1995 -- only 
eight years after 1987 -- her "ten years of management experience" imply that she began as a 
"Hooters Girl" after having already had management experience in another food service 
establishment. 
117105Id. 
118106Whiting Statement, supra note , at 2. 
119107My own undergraduate students usually have never heard of it, but they may not be a 
typical sample. 
120108Some restraint seems to have been shown, however, in the name of verisimilitude; the line 
was apparently drawn at having Meghan O'Malley-Barnard, a 27-year-old dancer and acting 
student, mouth Title VII case law.  See O'Malley-Barnard Statement, supra note ; Biographies, 
supra note , at 1-2. 
121109McNeil Statement, supra note , at 3. 
122110One could, indeed, rest the entire literary core of the work on the differences between 
those explanations.  In this way, the varying rhetoric creates the texture of the characters and their 
significance in the work.  Shakespeare is justly famous for this. 
123111EEOC Comments on Hooters' Press Offensive (Nov. 21, 1995) (press release, on file with 
author). 
124112Indeed, the EEOC release seems to have had just about as much effect as silence; 
practically none of the editorials written about this subject evidence any awareness that such a 
release was even distributed. 
125113McNeil Statement, supra note , at 4. 
126114Again, it is worth noting that although EEOC stands by its obligation to remain silent as to 
the substantive issues in a pending investigation, it could have chosen to remain entirely silent.  
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Its choice to provide the reader with enough information to wonder about Hooters's tactics, but 
not enough information to reach a final decision, is instructive. 
127115Hooters advertisement (November 1995) (on file with author) (capitals and italics in 
original). 
128116Id. 
129117Schneyer, Avoiding the Personal Pronoun, supra note , at 1323-25.  
130118A number of editorials (on both sides of the discrimination issue) made precisely this 
suggestion, going so far as to say that a new restaurant ought to be started with men dressed for 
the entertainment of women.  The most commonly suggested name for this restaurant was 
"Buns".  See, e.g., Joan Vennochi, Who Gives a Hoot?, BOSTON GLOBE, May 28, 1997, at D1, 
D1; Men Wouldn't Allow Restaurant About Them, POST-STANDARD (Syracuse, NY), Dec. 1, 
1995, at A19. 
131119See Generally James J. Graham, Suspension of Contractors and Ongoing Criminal 
Investigations for Contract Fraud:  Looking for Fairness from a Tightrope of Competing 
Interests, 14 PUB. CONT. L.J. 216 (1984). 
132120See Hooters Press Release, supra note , at 2; Backgrounder, supra note , at 2-3; McNeil 
Statement, supra note , at 2. 
133121Hooters Press Release, supra note , at 2; McNeil Statement, supra note , at 2. 
134122Schneyer, Avoiding the Personal Pronoun, supra note , at 1347-48 (footnotes omitted).  
You should notice that I stand in precisely the same position with regard to the Hooters press kit: 
while it is probably easy for you to obtain various newspaper articles and editorials heavily based 
on the press kit, the kit itself is something to which I have access and you do not.  Consequently, 
as in the lawsuit reported in id., I must be very careful to show you where my information comes 
from and the extent to which I am summarizing it.  In a footnote of my earlier article, I point out 
that the very act of telling you about this rhetorical problem creates an enhanced level of trust 
between us.  Id. at 1348 n.111.  Note the similarity between this argument and the one made at 
supra note  and accompanying text. 
135123This is why securities law generally requires that maximum information, in relatively 
identical format, be given to investors, and that advertising, in general, be highly limited:  the 
theory is that investors can indeed make intelligent decisions, but only when they are provided 
with accurate and complete information.  J. Robert Brown, Corporate Secrecy, the Federal 
Securities Laws, and the Disclosure of Ongoing Negotiations, 36 CATH. U.L. REV.  93, 93 n.2 
(1986); Richard S. Hardy, The New Gold Rush: The Last Frontier of the Securities Laws?, 29 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 359, 364-65 (1989). 
136124The irony here is similar to that in Burton Lane and Alan Jay Lerner's famous song,  How 
Could You Believe Me When I Said I Love You When You Know I've Been a Liar All My Life?  
The most well-known version of this song may be seen and heard in the film ROYAL WEDDING 
(MGM 1951). 
137125I remember a seminar in law school in which students were assigned the task of writing in 
support of, or against, the argument propounded by a scholar in a law review or other academic 
journal.  About midway through the term we rebelled against this practice, saying that our 
reactions to the articles were far more complicated than could be expressed as support or 
opposition and that, further, asking us to be "advocates" of theoretical positions without recourse 
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to our own feelings or reactions was unrealistic.  I should add that this was a seminar in feminist 
approaches to legal theory, and we felt that our reaction to the process reflected a valid critique of 
legal thinking and legal method generally.  The professor running the seminar entirely 
sympathized with our concerns, and permitted us to begin writing rigorous "reactions" to the 
pieces that did not necessarily support or refute them. 
138126Sex Discrimination:  Does Refusing to Hire Men as Food Servers Violate the Civil Rights 
Act?, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1996, at 40 (hereinafter Sex Discrimination); Mary Becker, Yes:  
Discrimination Helps Companies Trade on Women's Sexuality, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1996, at 40;  
Patricia A. Casey, No:  A Business Has a Right to Choose Its Own Character, A.B.A. J., Feb. 
1996, at 41.  I do not discuss the meanings of the titles of the two position papers, because the 
titles were supplied by the editors of the ABA Journal without consultation with the authors; 
consequently they can be looked at as separable texts.  Having said that, there is still an argument 
that the titles should be included in the analysis anyway.  First, the reader of the articles would 
not necessarily be aware that the titles were supplied, although it is a common editorial practice 
and anyone with experience in writing for newspapers or magazines would be aware of it.  Most 
readers (even most lawyer-readers) are not in that category, and would think of the title as part of 
the piece.  Second, regardless of whether the reader actually knows that the editor supplied the 
title, nevertheless the title appears, in large, boldface type, at the top of the article, and may be the 
only part of the article many readers see.  While these are compelling arguments, my own 
awareness of the different source of the titles makes it difficult for me to think of text and title as 
an organic whole. 
139127Prof. Becker's interests in both employment law and feminist jurisprudence are 
longstanding and public.  See, e.g.,  Mary Becker, How Free is Speech at Work?, 29 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 815 (1996); Mary Becker, Reproductive Hazards After Johnson Controls, 31 HOUS. L. 
REV. 43 (1994);  Mary Becker, Four Feminist Theoretical Approaches and the Double-Bind of 
Surrogacy, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 303 (1993); Mary Becker, Prince Charming: An Abstract 
Equality, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 201. 
140128Sex Discrimination, supra note , at 40. 
141129Becker, supra note , at 40. 
142130517 F.Supp. 292 (S.D. Tx. 1981). 
143131For a resonant hymn to the complexities of precedent, see WHITE, ACTS OF HOPE, supra 
note , at 153-83.  
144132"The life of the law has not been logic:  it has been experience."  OLIVER WENDELL 
HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). 
145133See, e.g., PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE: HOW LAW IS SUFFOCATING 
AMERICA (1994).  See also Schneyer, supra note , at 155-57. 
146134Becker, supra note , at 40, quoting Wilson, 517 F. Supp. at 303 (brackets supplied by 
Becker). 
147135Becker, supra note , at 40. 
148136Id. 
149137At this point it should be noted that Casey's legal assumption about the case does not 
match Becker's.  Casey believes that finding in favor of Hooters is consistent with Wilson, 
because sexuality really is the essence of Hooters's business while it wasn't the essence of 
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Southwest's.  This distinction is found nowhere in Becker's piece, and it is clear from the way her 
article is written that she doesn't believe in it. 
150138Becker, supra note , at 40. 
151139Id. 
152140Becker is a proponent of this school of thought.  See supra note . 
153141See Cahill, supra note , at 1145-47; see also supra note  and accompanying text.  You will 
note that I use the word "we" to refer to feminist academic lawyers, overtly including myself in 
that group.  By doing this I remind you of my biases, and simultaneously try to form a 
community including both myself and Becker.  Do I also create the impression that you, the 
reader, ought to include yourself in this community of feminists?  It might be argued that 
Becker's position does take the fate of specific people into account -- notably the specific women 
who work at Hooters now and are the victims of this exploitation.  Yet how can one make this 
argument without dismissing all of the apparently subjective views of the servers themselves as 
"false consciousness?"  See Rhee, supra note , at 185-87. 
154142Becker, supra note , at 40.  In this context, however, it is important to note that servers at 
Hooters apparently earn considerably more in tips than their counterparts at other restaurants.  
See Rhee, supra note , at 186-87; Joe Sonneman, Hooters' Real Bias Is Against Some of Its 
Patrons, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 1, 1996, at A18; Stetler, supra note , at *4. 
155143See, e.g., St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 202, 525-43 (1993) (Souter, J., 
dissenting); Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 60-71 (1982) 
(Rehnquist, J. dissenting). 
156144The two that spring immediately to mind are Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 65-76 
(1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting), and Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552-63 (1896) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting). 
157145I am aware of the dangers of this particular kind of rhetoric.  It is "liberal", in the sense 
that it treats the procedures of contemporary legal culture, which have been designed by, and 
serve to perpetuate, the existing power structure, as fit devices for undermining, humanizing or 
leveling that structure.  Such a set of assumptions has been sharply criticized by an entire 
generation of legal scholars  See MARK KELLMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 3-4 
(1987); Kennedy, supra note .  Nevertheless, Becker's article is addressed to the members of the 
American Bar Association, an organization made up of people firmly entrenched in the legal 
culture.  When addressing such a group, it is probably pointless to say that the culture of which 
they are a part is wicked.  Instead, it is better to teach them that they can, and should, use the 
power given to them by that culture to help others.  If the members of the culture come to believe 
that it is supposed to serve these functions, that may serve as a marginal alteration in the culture 
itself.  This is debatable, but I am writing within my own belief system, just as you are reading 
within yours. 
158146Casey, supra note , at 41. 
159147Sex Discrimination, supra note  at 40; brackets added. 
160148Casey, supra note , at 41. 
161149Q&A, supra note , at 1; Backgrounder, supra note , at 1. 
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162150Such a sentiment would correspond pretty well to the historical development of cultural 
consciousness about discrimination in this country.  See supra note  and accompanying text. 
163151On the other hand, it has been pointed out that the rules of statutory interpretation are 
many and mutually contradictory.  See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate 
Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to be Interpreted, 3 VAND. L. REV. 
395, 401-06 (1950).  Thus, the rule "Words are to be taken in their ordinary meaning unless they 
are technical terms or words of art", id. at 404, which corresponds to the remark I made in the 
text accompanying this footnote, is met with the rule, "Popular words may bear a technical 
meaning and technical words may have a popular significance and they should be so construed as 
to agree with evident intention or to make the statute operative",  id., which may belie the use of 
common sense in this context. 
164152Not coincidentally, the documents in the Hooters press kit also make repeated references 
to "common sense" as the determining factor; they say that "[t]he issue isn't sex discrimination.  
It's common sense."  Hooters Press Release, supra note , at 1; McNeil Statement, supra note , at 
1. 
165153UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 206 (1991). 
166154Dinesh D'Souza springs to mind as one whose career has been so enhanced.  See, e.g., 
DINESH D'SOUZA, ILLIBERAL EDUCATION: THE POLITICS OF RACE AND SEX ON CAMPUS (1991).  
D'Souza and Stanley Fish actually engaged in a series of touring debates on the subject. See 
Geoffrey W. Castello, Almost a Pragmatist, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 967- 968-69 (1996) 
(reviewing STANLEY FISH, PROFESSIONAL CORRECTNESS: LITERARY STUDIES AND POLITICAL 
CHANGE (1995)). 
167155Casey, supra note , at 41. 
168156Id. 
16915742 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(e) (West 1994). 
170158This particular criticism of government regulators is becoming increasingly popular.  See, 
e.g., HOWARD, supra note .  Aside from whatever basis this criticism may have in fact, it may be 
a symptom of the increasing feeling of remoteness that many people associate with government 
in general and the federal government in particular. 
171159See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. S5534-01 (Apr. 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hutchinson); 141 
CONG. REC. E285-04 (Feb. 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Cunningham). 
172160I have commented, elsewhere, on the difficult rhetorical position of the litigator, and the 
pitfalls of misleading language.  See Schneyer, Avoiding the Personal Pronoun, supra note , at 
1345-46. 
173161Elsewhere I have criticized judges for engaging in the same sort of implied annihilation of 
the intelligence of the other.  For me, this particular sort of rhetoric is always bad, because it 
forecloses the possibility of productive conversation between two or more independent minds.  
See Schneyer, supra note , at 142-44. 
174162Casey, supra note , at 41. 
175163For the last three years, the A.B.A. Journal has printed photographs of the authors of its 
"At Issue" columns along with the text of the articles.  Consequently, while drafting this section I 
had the faces of Mary Becker and Patricia Casey smiling at me as I wrote.  Did that make a 
difference? 
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176 
177 An illustration by John Schmelzer accompanies these two articles.  See Sex 
Discrimination, supra note , at 41. In the illustration, an artist at a drawing board (presumably 
Schmelzer himself) is attempting to sketch two different pictures of restaurants, one called 
"Classic" and the other apparently called "Nouveau."  The "Classic" picture shows a scene that 
seemingly represents Hooters as it is now, with young women in shorts and tank tops carrying 
trays; a picture of a "Hooters girl", which the artist has evidently used as a model for the 
waitresses, is pinned up on the wall next to him.  The "Nouveau" picture shows young men 
waiters in shorts and tee shirts with the words "Nouveau" printed on them, and one more 
traditional, overweight male bartender.  However, in a style reminiscent of M.C. Escher's 
Reptiles (1943) or Drawing Hands (1948), the figures in the sketches are refusing to stay there.   
They emerge from the pictures to engage in fierce, finger-pointing, fist-shaking arguments with 
each other and with the artist himself, who has stopped drawing in dismay.  Two of the figures 
have obtained erasers with which they are purposefully approaching the drawing board.  This 
illustration demonstrates the potential for constitutive rhetoric in non-verbal representations.  
How is Schmelzer defining himself?  How is he defining the controversy and the people in it?  
What does he expect of his viewer?  What are his notions of right and wrong in this context?  For 
the Escher drawings mentioned, see M.C. ESCHER, THE GRAPHIC WORK OF M.C ESCHER plates 
28, 69 (1967). 
178164See supra note  and accompanying text. 
179165See Ed Cohen, Typing Wilde: Construing the "Desire to Appear to Be a Person Inclined to 
the Commission of the Gravest of All Offenses", 5 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1 (1993). 
180166O. J. Simpson, a well-known former professional athlete and actor, was tried for the 
murder of his wife and her lover in 1995.  The trial, which lasted for many weeks and ended in 
Simpson's acquittal, received constant and intense attention from the media, especially television.  
The many discourses created around this event involved the value of criminal trial procedure, the 
place of race in American culture, the interaction between racial identity and factfinding, the 
concept of credibility and truth, and, of course, practically endless scrutiny of the role of the 
media itself. 
181167In a resonant passage from C. S. Lewis, an in-house writer has been assigned the task of 
manufacturing editorials commenting on events taking place at his own place of business.  One, 
destined "for one of the most respectable of our papers," begins this way:  "While it would be 
premature to make any final comment on last night's riot at Edgestow, two conclusions seem to 
emerge from the first accounts (which we publish elsewhere) with a clarity which is not likely to 
be shaken by subsequent developments."  C.S. LEWIS, THAT HIDEOUS STRENGTH 131 (Macmillan 
Paperbacks Edition 1965) (1946).  The second, written "for a more popular organ", id., begins:  
"What is happening at Edgestow?  That is the question which John Citizen wants to have 
answered.  The Institute which has settled at Edgestow is a National Institute.  That means it is 
yours and mine." Id. at 133.  In Lewis's work, the complacency with which the writer 
manufactures these two different articles is taken as a sign of how far he has been corrupted and 
how badly he needs reclamation. 
182168James Bovard, The EEOC's War on Hooters, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 1995, at A18. 
183169Hooters Won't Hire Men, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 1995, at A20. 
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184170See Hootin' and Hollerin' Over Hooters, WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 1995, at A21.  Several of my 
students in the Winter, 1995-96 term independently decided to write papers based on the Hooters 
discrimination scenario; in all cases they had been motivated by reading the Bovard editorial. 
185171See, e.g., JAMES BOVARD, SHAKEDOWN:  HOW THE GOVERNMENT SCREWS YOU FROM A TO 
Z (1995); JAMES BOVARD, LOST RIGHTS:  THE DESTRUCTION OF AMERICAN LIBERTY (1994) 
[hereinafter BOVARD, LOST RIGHTS]; JAMES BOVARD, THE FAIR TRADE FRAUD (1991); JAMES 
BOVARD, THE FARM FIASCO (1989). 
186172He is not, for example, especially fond of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.  See 
BOVARD, LOST RIGHTS, supra note , at 92. 
187173Bovard, supra note , at A18. 
188174Id.; see supra note  and accompanying text. 
189175For obscure reasons, the name "Bruce" has been associated with male homosexuality for 
several decades.  I have been unable to find scholarly analysis of this phenomenon, but I think 
that it is so pervasive as to warrant "judicial notice."  See, e.g., Metro Desk -- The State, L.A. 
TIMES, July 16, 1989, at 2 (". . . a man named Bruce, who was probably 'a limp-wristed queer' or 
'faggot'). 
190176This is an interesting rhetorical device, since a corporation is not a human being and has 
neither intimacy nor soul.  See Schneyer, supra note , at 141 n.80. 
191177Consider the first sentence of the paragraph containing this footnote, in which I purport to 
tell you how much of the editorial is devoted to narrative; it looks like a simple statement of 
objective fact -- but is it? 
192178The wish for the destruction of boundaries between people is known to be a deeply-felt, 
and perhaps universal, human desire -- although it has been frequently seen as essentially 
infantile.  See generally HARRIET GOLDHOR LERNER, THE DANCE OF ANGER (1985); M. SCOTT 
PECK, THE ROAD LESS TRAVELLED (1978); DAVID SCHNARCH, PASSIONATE MARRIAGE (1997).  
This is not the same sort of thing, however, as the somewhat similar device used by Mary Becker 
in her essay.  In Becker's piece, the use of the storytelling form invoked a community that was 
already shared by the readers, namely the community of lawyers familiar with the notion of 
argument from precedent.  See supra notes - and accompanying text.  It is the difference between 
showing someone a form of argument he recognizes and telling someone that no argument is 
really necessary. 
193179Bovard, supra note , at A18. 
194180James Boyd White has shown how the opening sentence of the Declaration of 
Independence performs a similar function, by causing the reader to unwittingly assent to major 
assumptions within it.  WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE, supra note , at 233. 
195181It is interesting to note that nowhere else in the editorial does Bovard allude to either his 
methods of obtaining information or the level of his success in getting it. 
196182Bovard, supra note  (brackets and ellipsis in original). 
197183Id. 
198184Note, though, how this strategy differs from the technique used in the Hooters press 
release.  There, the EEOC appeared to be a faceless, soulless, monolithic entity that acted without 
regard to human consequences but had real effects on the lives of people.  See supra text 
accompanying notes -.  Here, by contrast, the EEOC as a law enforcement entity is almost erased 
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altogether in favor of its individual employees, whose personal agendas dominate the 
proceedings.  This pair of extremes -- in which the EEOC is either bad because it is impersonal 
or bad because it is too personal -- is reminiscent of the classic contrasts between law and equity, 
or between statutes and common law.  We fear that the law without mollification or adjustment 
by human sympathy will be coldly destructive in its indifference to human diversity and 
idiosyncracy, yet we fear that giving increased discretion to judges or executive officers will 
result in radically unequal and unfair treatment of people because of those individuals' personal 
prejudices and agendas.  We hate the tyranny of the individual's whim, but we hate being 
governed by thousands of uniform rules too.  See generally HOWARD, supra note . 
199185Bovard, supra note , at A18.  Owing to the industry-wide practice of newspapers and 
magazines to add section headings that were not originally included by the author, we can 
speculate that Bovard himself did not contemplate the boldface words "Sex Appeal" where they 
actually appear in the article.  Nevertheless, because I am analyzing not Bovard's subjective 
intentions but the voice created by his editorial as published, I include the headings as part of that 
voice. 
200186See supra notes - and accompanying text. 
201187Bovard, supra note , at A18. 
202188Id.  I have phrased the preceding list in what I hope is a dispassionate and "sanitized" tone, 
giving essentially no details and leaving out all of the commentary that pervades Bovard's work.  
But is my tone really dispassionate?  In trying to avoid taking on Bovard's highly opinionated 
syntax, have I gone so far in the other direction as to take the EEOC's side? 
203189Id. 
204190Id. 
205191Id. 
206192Id. 
207193Id. 
208194Since I do not, myself, have access to any such data, I have made these numbers up.  This 
sentence, as well as the two other examples following it, are designed to show a style and method 
of argument, not any factual information. 
209195Bovard, supra note , at A18. 
210196Many people, for example, have angrily denounced any comparison between efforts to 
eliminate discrimination based on sexual orientation to efforts to eliminate discrimination based 
on race.  See, e.g., Margaret M. Russell, Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual Rights and the "Civil Rights 
Agenda", 1 AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y REP. 33 (1994). 
21119742 U.S.C.A. § 2000a (West 1994). 
212198See Nancy E. Dowd, Liberty vs. Equality: In Defense of Privileged White Males, 34 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 429 (1993) (reviewing RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE 
AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992)). 
213199The size of the tip, however, is not the only criterion in determining whether workers 
benefit from a certain kind of employment.  At least one commentator has suggested that the 
price paid for this particular kind of exploitation is worth more than the increased tips.  See 
Ciriello, supra note .  
-66- 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
214200You will observe an assumption underlying this sentence.  By stating that the dearth of 
editorials supporting EEOC was due to the success of Hooters's advertising campaign, I am 
assuming that EEOC's position was strong enough to have merited more support without that 
campaign.  A reader who supports Hooters could reply that the reason behind the strong editorial 
support for Hooters is simply that Hooters was obviously in the right.  Hooters may have been in 
the right, but given the disparity in resources devoted to convincing the public (Hooters spent a 
great deal of money on it, while EEOC spent essentially nothing), it is impossible to attribute the 
lopsided editorial support simply to the strength of the arguments.  Of course, editorial writers 
might have been just as outraged had the EEOC also spent a million dollars on advertising, but 
my instincts tell me otherwise.  Naturally my instincts are personal; yours may tell you 
differently.  To a certain extent this sort of supposition can be verified or refuted using those 
aspects of the scientific method that are open to social scientists. 
215201Laura Archer Pulfer, Morning Edition: Hooters Patrons Must Not Care Much About Food 
or Women (National Public Radio broadcast, Nov. 29, 1995). 
216202Id. 
217203See, e.g., Jim Haynes, Hooters Exposes Other Wrongs to Redress, ARIZ. REPUBLIC / 
PHOENIX GAZETTE, Dec. 10, 1995, at H3; Hooting for the Shutdown, RICHMOND TIMES-
DISPATCH, Nov. 16, 1995, at A26; Who Gives a Hoot?, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Nov. 18, 
1995, at 14A; 
218204Pulfer, supra note . 
219205See supra text accompanying notes -.  I made my observations and reached my 
conclusions concerning the photograph before reading Pulfer's commentary.  (But why do I find 
it necessary to tell you this?  Does it increase the veracity of my own observations that I made 
them independently?  Or, to the contrary, does the fact that Pulfer and I agree with one another 
actually discredit any praise I give her rhetoric?) 
220206RuPaul is the professional name of RuPaul Andre Charles, a prominent singer, film actor 
and television/radio personality, whose trademark is his superb ability as a "drag queen."  See 
generally RUPAUL, LETTIN IT ALL HANG OUT (1995).  I admit that, although I suspected what she 
meant, I did not get the joke at first; I had to look it up. 
221207I have, however, sharply criticized the Socratic method elsewhere.  See, e.g., Kenneth L. 
Schneyer, Bully Pulpit:  Effective Teachers Face Their Power over Students Honestly, L. TCHR. 
(Spring, 1996) at 1.  See also Gerald Wetlaufer, Rhetoric and Its Denial in Legal Discourse, 76 
VA. L. REV. 1545 (1990). 
222208Pulfer, supra note . 
223209I have not, as yet, been able to find news articles indicating that Hooters has retained Mr. 
Jordan in any capacity. 
224210See generally Iris Cohen Selinger, Hamilton Jordan:  Ex-Carter Aide Plunges into Book 
Marketing at Whittle, ADWEEK, Mar. 18. 1991 (Eastern Ed.), at 12; Carter Aide Jordan to Run 
for Senate, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 2. 1985, at 22. 
225211Pulfer, supra note . 
226212See Ciriello, supra note ; Rhee, supra note , at 180-85.  For a feminist analysis that resists 
the logic of the anti-commodification approach, see DRUCILLA CORNELL, THE IMAGINARY 
DOMAIN: ABORTION, PORNOGRAPHY & SEXUAL HARASSMENT (1995). 
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227213See Ciriello, supra note . 
228214See Backgrounder, supra note , at 1; Fact Sheet, supra note , at 1-2; McNeil Statement, 
supra note , at 2; Whiting Statement, supra note , at 1. 
